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CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES
RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL LAW
EDITED BY JEAN GALBRAITH*

In this section:
• Trump Administration Announces Withdrawal from Four International Agreements
• Congress Passes Legislation Implementing the Marrakesh Treaty
• Palestine Brings a Case Against the United States in the International Court of Justice at a
Fraught Time for U.S.-Palestinian Relations
• NAFTA Is Renegotiated and Signed by the United States
• Congress Signals Concern Over U.S. Role in Aiding Saudi Arabia’s Activities in Yemen
• Trump Administration Expresses Strong Disapproval of the International Criminal
Court
• Iran Initiates Suit Against the United States in the International Court of Justice, While
Sanctions Take Effect

* Kristen DeWilde, Emily Kyle, Patricia Liverpool, Sabrina Ruchelli, Jenna Smith, and Brian Yeh contributed
to the preparation of this section.
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GENERAL INTERNATIONAL AND U.S. FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
Trump Administration Announces Withdrawal from Four International Agreements
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.115
In October of 2018, the Trump administration announced that the United States would
withdraw from four international agreements. On October 3, 2018, Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo announced that the United States would withdraw from the Treaty of Amity,
Economic Relations, and Consular Rights with Iran. Later that day, National Security
Advisor John Bolton announced that the United States was also withdrawing from the
Optional Protocol to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Both
withdrawals were triggered by pending International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases grounded in
these treaties that were recently brought against the United States. Two weeks later, in an escalation of the ongoing trade dispute with China, the United States gave notice of withdrawal
from the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the international body charged with overseeing the
international mailing system. Finally, on October 22, 2018, President Trump announced that
the United States would be terminating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
with Russia. Unlike other withdrawals undertaken by the Trump administration, this latest
round involved three Article II treaties to which the Senate had provided its advice and consent.
In addition, the international commitments withdrawn from in this round were long-standing
ones, with U.S. participation in the UPU going back as far as 1875.
The U.S. decision to withdraw from the Treaty of Amity came on the heels of a unanimous
ruling by the ICJ directing the United States to ensure that the sanctions it imposed on Iran after
withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) did not affect the export of
humanitarian goods to the country.1 In announcing the withdrawal, Pompeo stated:
I’m announcing that the United States is terminating the 1955 Treaty of Amity with
Iran. This is a decision, frankly, that is 39 years overdue. In July, Iran brought a meritless
case in the International Court of Justice alleging violations of the Treaty of Amity. . . .
Iran is attempting to interfere with the sovereign rights of the United States to take lawful
actions necessary to protect our national security. And Iran is abusing the ICJ for political
and propaganda purposes and their case, as you can see from the decision, lacked merit.
...
In light of how Iran has hypocritically and groundlessly abused the ICJ as a forum for
attacking the United States, I am therefore announcing today that the United States is
terminating the Treaty of Amity with Iran. I hope that Iran’s leaders will come to recognize that the only way to secure a bright future for its country is by ceasing their campaign
of terror and destruction around the world.2
Ratiﬁed by the United States on September 14, 1956, after the Senate provided its advice
and consent on July 11, 1956, the Treaty of Amity addresses economic and consular relations
1
For further discussion of this ICJ case and the provisional measures ordered in it, see generally Jean Galbraith,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 174 (2019).
2
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Brieﬁng, Remarks to the Media (Oct. 3, 2018), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2018/10/286417.htm [https://perma.cc/2V8J-3FPS].
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between the United States and Iran.3 Article XXI of the Treaty provides for ICJ jurisdiction
over disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the Treaty.4 Article XXIII,
which contains the withdrawal provision, provides in relevant part that “[e]ither High
Contracting Party may, by giving one year’s written notice to the other High Contracting
Party, terminate the present Treaty at the end of the initial ten-year period or at any time
thereafter.”5 As a matter of U.S. domestic law, the prevailing view is that the president has
the power to withdraw the United States from treaties approved by the Senate without returning to the Senate, as long as the withdrawal is consistent with international law.6 This view has
never been resolved by the Supreme Court and is not without dispute.7 In practice, however,
it is the approach taken by the executive branch, and provided that the executive branch has
given the requisite written notice to Iran, the U.S. withdrawal will become effective in
October 2019. While the practical importance of the Treaty of Amity has been limited
since the Iranian revolution in the late 1970s, U.S. withdrawal will have the effect of removing
a jurisdictional gateway to the ICJ that both countries have used in the past.8
On the same day that Pompeo announced the planned U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty of
Amity, Bolton declared that the United States would withdraw from the VCDR’s Optional
Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, following a suit brought against
the United States in the ICJ by Palestine.9 This Optional Protocol provides for ICJ jurisdiction
3

Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., Aug. 15, 1955, 8 UST 899.
Id. Art. XXI(2).
5
Id. Art. XXIII(3).
6
While “[t]he Constitution provides that the President can make treaties with the advice and consent of twothirds of the Senate, . . . it says nothing speciﬁc about what domestic actor or actors have the power to withdraw the
United States from treaties.” Jean Galbraith, The President’s Power to Withdraw the United States from International
Agreements at Present and in the Future, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 445, 446 (2018). Since the 1930s, presidents have
unilaterally withdrawn the United States from numerous Article II treaties, including President Carter’s high-proﬁle decision to withdraw the United States from its mutual defense treaty with Taiwan in the late 1970s. See generally Curtis A. Bradley, Treaty Termination and Historical Gloss, 92 TEX. L. REV. 773 (2014) (tracing the historical
development of the constitutional understanding that the president has the unilateral authority to terminate
Article II treaties). Both Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law and Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign
Relations Law consider the president to have the authority to withdraw the United States from Article II
treaties where this withdrawal is permitted under international law. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 339 (1986); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 313 (2018).
7
In Goldwater v. Carter, the Supreme Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to address the constitutionality of President Carter’s withdrawal from the mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. 444 U.S. 996 (1979). For a
recent argument that the president does not have the unilateral authority to terminate some Article II treaties even
where permitted to do so by international law, see Harold Hongju Koh, Presidential Power to Terminate
International Agreements, 128 YALE L. J. F. 432, 454 (2018) (arguing that “U.S. withdrawal from a long-standing
treaty or international organization . . . should not become effective without congressional involvement”).
8
Galbraith, supra note 1, at __ (noting three prior ICJ cases grounded in the Treaty of Amity, two of which
were brought by Iran); see also Chimène Keitner, What Are the Consequences of the Trump Administration’s Recent
Treaty Withdrawals?, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 17, 2018), at https://www.justsecurity.org/61101/consequencestrump-administrations-treaty-withdrawals (describing the Treaty of Amity as “defunct de facto for decades”);
John Bellinger, Thoughts on the ICJ’s Decision in Iran v. United States and the Trump Administration’s Treaty
Withdrawals, LAWFARE (Oct. 5, 2018), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/thoughts-icjs-decision-iran-v-unitedstates-and-trump-administrations-treaty-withdrawals (calling the U.S. withdrawal a “prudent” response to
Iran’s use of the Treaty of Amity “as an instrument of lawfare”).
9
White House Press Release, Press Brieﬁng by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders, Small Business Administrator
Linda McMahon, and National Security Advisor (Oct. 3, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/press-brieﬁng-press-secretary-sarah-sanders-small-business-administrator-linda-mcmahon-national-security-advisor-100318/ [https://perma.cc/CTX6-W8N5] [hereinafter Bolton Brieﬁng]. For further discussion of this
ICJ case, see generally Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 174 (2019).
4
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between parties over all disputes “arising out of the interpretation or application of” the VCDR,
which in turn sets forth international legal rules regarding diplomatic relations between states.10
The United States ratiﬁed the VCDR and the Optional Protocol on November 8, 1972, a few
years after the Senate had provided its advice and consent to both on September 14, 1965.11
Bolton stated:
In addition to the Treaty of Amity, I am announcing that the President has decided that
the United States will withdraw from the Optional Protocol and Dispute Resolution to
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. This is in connection with a case
brought by the so-called “State of Palestine,” naming the United States as defendant,
challenging our move of our embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
I’d like to stress: The United States remains a party to the underlying Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations and we expect all other parties to abide by their international
obligations under the Convention.
Our actions today are consistent with the decisions President Reagan made in the 1980s
in the wake of the politicized suits against the United States by Nicaragua to terminate
our acceptance of the Optional Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice under Article 36(2) of the ICJ statute and his decision to withdraw from a bilateral
treaty with Nicaragua.
It is also consistent with the decision President Bush made in 2005 to withdraw from the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations following the ICJ’s
interference in our domestic criminal justice system.
So our actions today deal with the treaties and current litigation involving the United
States before the International Court of Justice. Given this history and Iran’s abuse of
the ICJ, we will commence a review of all international agreements that may still expose
the United States to purported binding jurisdiction dispute resolution in the
International Court of Justice. The United States will not sit idly by as baseless, politicized claims are brought against us.12
In response to a question, Bolton further emphasized that both treaty withdrawals were at
least partly motivated by the administration’s concerns about international courts:
Look, this is really—has less to do with Iran and the Palestinians than with the continued
consistent policy of the United States to reject the jurisdiction of the International Court
of Justice, which we think is politicized and ineffective. It relates, obviously, in part, to
our views on the International Criminal Court and to the nature of so-called purported
international courts to be able to bind the United States.13
10

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and Optional Protocol on Disputes, Art. 1, Apr. 18, 1961, 23
UST 3227, 500 UNTS 95 [hereinafter VCDR & Op-Pro].
11
See id. Several more years would pass before the United States passed legislation consistent with the VCDR
with respect to diplomatic immunity. See William F. Marmon, Jr., Note, Diplomatic Relations Act of 1978 and Its
Consequences, 19 VA. J. INT’L L. 131, 139 (1978) (observing that the preexisting statutory scheme, unlike the
VCDR, “did not distinguish among different classes of diplomatic staff for purposes of granting immunity”).
12
Bolton Brieﬁng, supra note 9.
13
Id.

2019

CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE OF THE UNITED STATES

135

It is unclear whether the United States has a right under international law to withdraw from
the Optional Protocol. The treaty itself does not contain an express provision governing withdrawal.14 The validity of the U.S. withdrawal under international law therefore turns on
whether it was performed in accordance with the relevant principles of customary international law. Article 56 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), which
may reﬂect customary international law, provides:
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal unless:
a. It is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation or withdrawal; or
b. A right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the nature of the treaty.
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months’ notice of its intention to denounce or
withdraw from a treaty under paragraph 1.15
Article 56 “establishes a general presumption against unilateral denunciation.”16 Absent an
indication that the parties intended the possibility of withdrawal from the Optional Protocol,
the lawfulness of the announced U.S. withdrawal turns on whether treaties aimed at establishing a dispute settlement process are the type for which a right of withdrawal should be
implied. This question received attention in the lead-up to the VCLT, with Humphrey
Waldock reporting his view to the International Law Commission that “‘a treaty of
arbitration, conciliation or judicial settlement’” contained an implied right of withdrawal.17
In the Fisheries Jurisdiction case, the ICJ declined to “examine or pronounce” upon the “views
expressed by certain authorities to the effect that treaties of judicial settlement or declarations
of acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court are among those treaty provisions
which, by their very nature, may be subject to unilateral denunciation in the absence of
express provisions regarding their duration or termination.”18
Even if the Optional Protocol is the kind of treaty covered by Article 56(1)(b), the United
States has not sought to withdraw from it in a manner consistent with Article 56(2). Although
Article 56(2) requires one year of notice, the United States indicated in its notiﬁcation to the UN
14

See generally VCDR & Op. Pro, supra note 10.
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 56, 1155 UNTS 331, 8 ILM 679 (1969) [hereinafter
VCLT]. The VCLT includes other grounds for withdrawal that do not appear applicable here, including material
breach under speciﬁed circumstances, see id. Art. 60, impossibility of performance, see id. Art. 61, and fundamental change of circumstances, see id. Art. 62. See also Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slov.), 1997 ICJ
Rep. 7, 65 (Sept. 25) (concluding that “the stability of treaty relations requires that the plea of fundamental change
of circumstances be applied only in exceptional cases”). The United States is not a party to the VCLT but regards
many of its provisions as reﬂective of customary international law. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, at https://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm [https://perma.cc/5R7Q-ABQF].
16
Theodore Christakis, Article 56, in 2 THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY
1251, 1257 (Olivier Corten & Pierre Klein eds., 2011).
17
Laurence R. Helfer, Terminating Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO TREATIES 634, 638 (Duncan Hollis ed.,
2012) (quoting Waldock’s 1963 report to the International Law Commission and noting the tension between his
position and the approach previously recommended by Gerald Fitzmaurice); see also Christakis, supra note 16, at
1273 (noting that Waldock’s approach on this issue “provoked a sharp reaction from some members of the ILC”).
18
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland), Judgment, 1973 ICJ Rep. 3, at para. 29 (Feb. 2), at https://www.icjcij.org/ﬁles/case-related/55/055-19730202-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.
15
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secretary-general (who serves as the Optional Protocol’s depository) that its denunciation was
immediately effective. The United States wrote that it “hereby withdraws” from the Optional
Protocol and that “[a]s a consequence of this withdrawal, the United States will no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice reﬂected in that Protocol.”19 The
United States had used identical language in communicating its withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 2005.20 If withdrawal with immediate effect is not allowed for this treaty as a matter of international law, there is a strong argument
that it also lies beyond the president’s power to effectuate as a matter of U.S. domestic law.21
Two weeks after the United States announced its withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, it
also declared its intent to withdraw from the Universal Postal Union (UPU).22 Originally established in 1874, the UPU describes itself as “the second oldest international organization worldwide.”23 Among other things, it establishes the rates that member states’ postal services may
charge to deliver mail and small packages worldwide.24 Pursuant to a 1969 agreement adopted
by the UPU’s governing body establishing what is known as the “terminal dues” system, the
national postal service of a package’s country of origin must reimburse the postal service of
the destination country for the cost of handling and delivering the item.25 Under the current
arrangement, which is intended to “progressively incorporate the developing and least developed
countries into a target system,” countries pay terminal dues that vary depending on their particular stage of economic development.26 In practice, this has meant that the cost of shipping small
packages to the United States from China and other developing countries is often cheaper than
shipping domestically within the United States.27 The U.S. Postal Service lost an estimated $170
million in ﬁscal year 2017 as a result of the terminal dues system.28
In announcing the U.S. notice of withdrawal from the UPU, White House Press Secretary
Sarah Sanders stated:
19
United Nations, Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Concerning the
Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, at https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY& mtdsg_
no=III-5&chapter=3&clang=_en (reporting the U.S. communication of October 12, 2018).
20
Letter from Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, to Koﬁ Annan, UN Secretary-General (Mar. 7, 2005),
available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/87288.pdf [https://perma.cc/2RS9-DVZL].
21
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 313 (“[a]ccording to established practice, the
President has the authority to act on behalf of the United States in . . . withdrawing the United States from treaties,
either on the basis of terms in the treaty allowing for such action (such as a withdrawal clause) or on the basis of
international law that would justify such action”); Bradley, supra note 6, at 824 n. 292 (stating that “if international law causes a treaty to remain in force, then the U.S. Constitution may give the treaty a domestic-law status
that cannot be terminated unilaterally by the President” and noting the tension between this point and the 2005
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations).
22
White House Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary (Oct. 17, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-38 [https://perma.cc/82Q7-VCVK] [hereinafter White
House UPU Press Release].
23
Universal Postal Union, The UPU, http://www.upu.int/en/the-upu/the-upu.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2018).
24
See id.
25
See Universal Postal Union, About Terminal Dues and Transit Charges, at http://www.upu.int/en/activities/
terminal-dues-and-transit-charges/about-terminal-dues-and-transit-charges.html.
26
Id.; see also Eliot Kim, Withdrawal from the Universal Postal Union: A Guide for the Perplexed, LAWFARE
(Oct. 31, 2018), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/withdrawal-universal-postal-union-guide-perplexed.
27
Kim, supra note 26. Goods from Chinese companies account for approximately 60% of all packages shipped
into the United States. Glenn Thrush, Trump Opens New Front in His Battle with China: International Shipping,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/us/politics/trump-china-shipping.html.
28
Kim, supra note 26 (citing a report from the Postal Regulatory Commission).
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President Donald J. Trump received a report from the Department of State pursuant to
the August 23, 2018, Presidential Memorandum on “Modernizing the Monetary
Reimbursement Model for the Delivery of Goods Through the International Postal
System and Enhancing the Security and Safety of International Mail.” The report
noted that sufﬁcient progress has not been made on reforming terms of the Acts of the
Universal Postal Union (UPU) in line with the policies of the United States outlined in
the Memorandum. The report also recommended steps the United States can take to
address the problems identiﬁed in the Memorandum.
The President concurs with the Department of State’s recommendation to adopt selfdeclared rates for terminal dues as soon as practical, and no later than January 1,
2020. The Department of State will also ﬁle notice that the United States will withdraw
from the UPU. This will begin a one-year withdrawal process, as set forth in the UPU
Constitution. During this period, the Department of State will seek to negotiate bilateral
and multilateral agreements that resolve the problems discussed in the Presidential
Memorandum. If negotiations are successful, the Administration is prepared to rescind
the notice of withdrawal and remain in the UPU.29
Expressing his regret at the U.S. decision, UPU Director-General Bishar Hussein pledged
to meet with American ofﬁcials regarding the withdrawal.30 A spokesman for the Chinese
Foreign Ministry also expressed disappointment with the U.S. decision, saying that “China
is committed to upholding multilateralism” and pledging “to work with all relevant parties to
contribute to the development of the international postal cause.”31
Although neither the Presidential Memorandum nor the press statement characterized the
U.S. move as part of the ongoing U.S. trade dispute with China, the decision could exacerbate
already-strained trade relations between the two countries.32 Reporting indicates that China
was a focal point in the decision making surrounding withdrawal and that the United States
will unilaterally increase postal rates on China if the announced withdrawal is concluded.33
According to Article 12 of the UPU Constitution (as amended), the U.S. withdrawal
becomes effective one year after notice is received by the UPU director-general,34 which in
this case would make withdrawal effective on October 17, 2019.35 The U.S. withdrawal is
29

White House Press Release, Statement from the Press Secretary (Oct. 17, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.
gov/brieﬁngs-statements/statement-press-secretary-38 [https://perma.cc/82Q7-VCVK] [hereinafter White
House UPU Press Release].
30
Universal Postal Union Press Release, Statement on the Decision of the United States of America to
Withdraw from the Universal Postal Union Treaties (Oct. 17, 2018), at http://news.upu.int/no_cache/nd/statement-on-the-decision-of-the-united-states-of-america-to-withdraw-from-the-universal-postal-union-treaties.
31
Chinese Foreign Ministry Press Release, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lu Kang’s Regular Press Conference
on October 18, 2018 (Oct. 18, 2018), at https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xwfw_665399/s2510_665401/
t1605226.shtml.
32
Danielle Paquette, Trump Ditches 144-Year-Old Postal Pact that Boosts Chinese Retailers, WASH. POST (Oct.
17, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-ditches-144-year-old-postal-pactthat-boosts-chinese-retailers/2018/10/17/88aefea6-d234-11e8-8c22-fa2ef74bd6d6_story.html?utm_term=.
d320f10491d6.
33
Thrush, supra note 27.
34
Fourth Additional Protocol to the Constitution of the UPU, Art. III (1989) (amending Article 12 of the UPU
Constitution).
35
Universal Postal Union Press Release, Statement of UPU Deputy General Pascal Clivaz on the Decision by
the Government of the United States of America to Withdraw from the Universal Postal Union Treaties (Oct. 18,
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particularly notable in light of the length of time which the United States has belonged to the
UPU. The United States ﬁrst became a party to the UPU’s predecessor, the General Postal
Union, in 1875, when it joined the Treaty Concerning the Formation of a General Postal
Union,36 also known as the Treaty of Berne. In the intervening years, the General Postal
Union became the UPU (in 1878), became a UN specialized agency (in 1948), and made
numerous changes to its foundational documents and regulatory practices.37
As a matter of U.S. domestic law, discretion over international agreements related to the postal
system has long been delegated by Congress to the executive branch.38 The United States joined
the Treaty of Berne not via the advice and consent of the Senate, but rather as an ex ante congressional-executive agreement that relied on preexisting authority delegated by Congress to the president and the post-master general.39 Under the most recent statutory delegation, the secretary of
state has “the power to conclude postal treaties, conventions, and amendments related to international postal services.”40 The statute does not specify that it is delegating the power to terminate
such agreements, but the overall structure of ex ante congressional-executive agreements gives
reason to infer that the executive branch has this power as well.41 This preexisting statutory delegation will enable the executive branch to make complementary agreements (should it decide to

2018), at http://news.upu.int/no_cache/nd/statement-of-upu-deputy-director-general-pascal-clivaz-on-the-decision-by-the-government-of-the-united-states-of-america-to-withdraw-from-the-universal-postal-union-treaties
(observing that notice was received on October 17, 2018).
36
Treaty Concerning the Formation of a General Postal Union, 19 Stat. 577 (1874).
37
Rebecca Bratspies, Universal Postal Union, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., at http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e569.
38
For the earliest such delegation, see Act of Feb. 20, 1792, ch. 7, § 26, 1 Stat. 232, 239 (authorizing the
postmaster general to enter into agreements with international counterparts for mail delivery).
39
At the time, the operative statutory delegation came from An Act to Revise, Consolidate, and Amend the
Statutes Relating to the Post Ofﬁce Department, 17 Stat. 283 (1872) (providing that “the Postmaster-General, by
and with the advice and consent of the President, may negotiate and conclude postal treaties or conventions, and
may reduce or increase the rates of postage on mail-matter conveyed between the United States and foreign countries”). The postmaster general of the United States duly “ratiﬁed and approved” the Treaty of Berne on March 8,
1875, and the president “approve[d]” the treaty on the same day. Treaty Concerning the Formation of a General
Postal Union, 19 Stat. 577, 588 (1874). This use of an ex ante congressional-executive agreement rather than an
Article II treaty would later be cited as historical practice justifying the broader use of congressional-executive
agreements as a substitute for Article II treaties. E.g., Myres S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and
Congressional-Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE
L. J. 181, 344 (1945) (“the United States has remained a member of the Universal Postal Union since 1875
[and i]n [that] case also, the agreement was approved only by the President, pursuant to authority contained in
the postal statutes”); An Act to Provide for the Participation of the United States in the International Monetary
Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development: Hearing on H.R. 3314 Before the
S. Comm. on Banking & Currency, 79th Cong. 547 (1945) (“Reference has been made above to United
States membership in the Universal Postal Union pursuant to speciﬁc authorization by the Congress to the executive to ‘negotiate and conclude postal treaties or conventions’ and to ‘reduce or increase the rates of postage on
mail matter conveyed between the United States and foreign countries.’”) (citing the Act of June 8, 1872).
40
Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act, Pub. L. No. 109-435, at §405, 120 Stat. 3198, 3230 (2006)
(codiﬁed at 39 U.S.C. § 407) (further setting out objectives that the executive branch should pursue in its
negotiations).
41
See STEPHEN P. MULLIGAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44761, WITHDRAWAL FROM INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: LEGAL FRAMEWORK, THE PARIS AGREEMENT, AND THE IRAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT 7 (2018) (observing
that “[f]or congressional-executive agreements that Congress has preauthorized by statute (called ex ante agreements), Presidents sometimes have unilaterally terminated the agreement without objection”). The statute does
expressly indicate that the secretary of state has power to “renegotiate” postal treaties as well as to make them in the
ﬁrst place. Pub. L. No. 109-435, at § 405; 120 Stat. at 3231.
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stay in the UPU) or substitute agreements (should it follow through on its notiﬁcation and exit
the UPU) without the need for subsequent congressional approval of these agreements.
Continuing his administration’s retreat from various international commitments, President
Trump stated on October 20, 2018, that he planned to withdraw the United States from the
bilateral Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia.42 Explaining his decision
to withdraw, Trump told reporters that “Russia has not, unfortunately, honored the agreement.
So we’re going to terminate the agreement, and we’re going to pull out.”43 He continued, “We’ll
have to develop those weapons, unless Russia comes to us, and China comes to us, and they all
come to us and they say ‘Let’s really get smart and let’s none of us develop those weapons.’”44
Ratiﬁed by the United States on June 1, 1988 after the Senate provided its advice and consent on May 27, 1988,45 the INF prohibits the United States and Russia “from possessing,
producing or test-ﬂying ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to
5,500 kilometers and their launchers.”46 In a departure from other arms control treaties concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union, the INF, rather than regulating the
quantity of weapons each country may possess, “call[s] for eliminating an entire class of weapons.”47 It does not, however, prohibit the research and development of intermediate-range
nuclear missiles.48 In December 2017, amidst U.S. complaints about Russian violations of
the Treaty, the State Department announced that the Pentagon had begun “INF Treatycompliant research and development (R&D) by reviewing military concepts and options
for conventional, ground-launched, intermediate-range missile systems.”49
Russian violations were publicly announced by the Obama administration in 2014,50
although the United States was reportedly aware of Russian infractions as early as 2008.51
As a result of these activities, Congress in recent years began requiring the president to submit
ﬁndings regarding Russian compliance with the INF. Section 1243 of the John S. McCain
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2019, for example, requires
the president to determine whether the core prohibitions of the INF Treaty “remain binding
on the United States as a matter of United States law.”52 The following section expresses the
42
Donald J. Trump, Remarks in an Exchange with Reporters in Elko, Nevada, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC.
NO. 718, at 3 (Oct. 20).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 4–5.
45
Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Dec. 8, 1987, 1657 UNTS 2.
46
Hilary Hurd & Elena Chachko, U.S. Withdrawal from the INF Treaty: The Facts and the Law, LAWFARE
(Oct. 25, 2018), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-withdrawal-inf-treaty-facts-and-law.
47
Id.
48
John Hudson & Paul Sonne, Bolton Pushes Trump Administration to Withdraw from Landmark Arms Treaty,
WASH. POST (Oct. 19, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/bolton-pushestrump-administration-to-withdraw-from-landmark-arms-treaty/2018/10/19/f0bb8531-e7ce-4a34-b7ba558f8b068dc5_story.html?utm_term=.c7ca9ac48f46.
49
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Bureau of Arms Control, Veriﬁcation and Compliance Factsheet INF
Treaty: At a Glance (Dec. 8, 2017), at https://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/2017/276361.htm [https://perma.cc/
H9HQ-JW6A].
50
U.S. Dep’t of State, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments 8 (2014), available at https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/230108.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4R6D-6QL2].
51
Hurd & Chachko, supra note 46.
52
Pub. L. No. 115-232, § 1243(a)(2), __ Stat. __ (2018).
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sense of Congress that Russian violations “constitute a material breach of the INF Treaty,”
legally entitling the United States “to suspend the operation of the INF Treaty in whole or
in part for so long as the Russian Federation continues to be in material breach of the INF
Treaty.”53 Apart from Russian INF Treaty violations, however, the Trump administration
considers an additional interest in terminating the treaty to arise from China’s military buildup
in the Asia-Paciﬁc region.54 Because it was not a party to the INF Treaty, China has been able
to build up its stockpile of intermediate-range ballistic missiles without restrictions.55
The INF Treaty’s withdrawal clause provides that:
1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.
2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw
from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of
this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision
to withdraw to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such
notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.56
U.S. allies in Europe expressed dismay at the U.S. decision to withdraw.57 Following subsequent conversations with allies, on December 4, 2018, Pompeo announced that “the United
States today declares it has found Russia in material breach of the treaty and will suspend our
obligations as a remedy effective in 60 days unless Russia returns to full and veriﬁable compliance.”58 Pompeo made clear that this sixty-day delay was at the request of European allies.59
Pompeo’s remarks were accompanied by a statement issued the same day by the NATO foreign
ministers declaring Russia in violation of the INF treaty, “call[ing] on Russia to return urgently to
full and veriﬁable compliance” and noting that “[i]t is now up to Russia to preserve the INF
treaty.”60 In a question-and-answer period following Pompeo’s remarks, he appeared to indicate
that the United States would give formal notice of its withdrawal from the INF treaty at the end of
the sixty-day period if Russia failed to move sufﬁciently towards compliance within that period.61
53
Id. § 1244, __ Stat. at __; cf. VCLT, supra note 15, Art. 60 (setting out the conditions under international law
for suspension of treaty obligations in response to the material breach by another party).
54
David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, U.S. to Tell Russia It Is Leaving Landmark I.N.F. Treaty, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 19, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/us/politics/russia-nuclear-arms-treaty-trump-administration.html.
55
Hurd & Chachko, supra note 46.
56
INF Treaty, supra note 45, Art. XV.
57
Julian Borger & Andrew Roth, EU Warns Trump of Nuclear Arms Race Risk after INF Withdrawal Move,
GUARDIAN (Oct. 23, 2018), at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/oct/22/eu-us-nuclear-arms-race-inftreaty-bolton-moscow (describing responses from European leaders); Julian Borger, European Diplomats Mount
Last-Ditch Effort to Stop United States Scrapping INF Treaty, GUARDIAN (Nov. 18, 2018), at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/nov/18/inf-treaty-european-diplomats-us-russia (describing European efforts to try to
ward off the U.S. withdrawal).
58
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Brieﬁng, Press Availability at NATO Headquarters (Dec. 4, 2018), at https://www.
state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/12/287873.htm [https://perma.cc/4FEG-PC6A] [hereinafter Pompeo Brieﬁng].
59
Id. (“I will tell you, our European partners approve that extra time [of sixty days]”).
60
NATO Press Release, Statement on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (Dec. 4, 2018), at
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/ofﬁcial_texts_161122.htm?selectedLocale=en.
61
Pompeo Brieﬁng, supra note 58 (“stating that “[t]he six-month period will begin to run 60 days from now”
while also noting that “we would welcome a Russian change of heart . . . [and] over the next 60 days they have every
chance to do that”).
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The four recently announced U.S. withdrawals are consistent with a broader trend by the
Trump administration of pulling out of international commitments and engagements. Since
Trump took ofﬁce in January 2017, his administration has announced the present or future
U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, the JCPOA, UNESCO, and the UN Human
Rights Council, as well as disengaging from the Global Compact on Migration and the
Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership.62 Those commitments and engagements were multilateral, mostly
of recent vintage, and joined by the United States as a matter of domestic law not via the
advice and consent of the Senate, but rather through alternative constitutional processes.
While continuing the trend of disengagement, the four withdrawals announced in
October 2018 had some different features from the earlier wave. Two of the international
agreements at issue were bilateral rather than multilateral; three of these agreements were
joined by the United States as Article II treaties that received the advice and consent of
two-thirds of the Senate; and all of these agreements were long-standing ones, dating back
to 1875, 1956, 1972, and 1988. These announced terminations indicate that the Trump
administration has come to look beyond the rollback of major Obama-era initiatives and
to undertake a more wide-ranging reexamination of U.S. international commitments.

Congress Passes Legislation Implementing the Marrakesh Treaty
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.111

On October 9, 2018, President Trump signed into law a statute that implements the
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind,
Visually Impaired or Otherwise Print Disabled (Marrakesh Treaty).1 The implementing
legislation broadens access to published works for persons with visual disabilities and paves
the way for the United States to ratify the Marrakesh Treaty.
Administered by the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the multilateral
Marrakesh Treaty was adopted on June 27, 2013 at the end of a diplomatic conference convened in Morocco and entered into force on September 30, 2016.2 The treaty requires parties
62
See Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 111 AJIL
1036 (2017) (discussing the announced U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement); Jean Galbraith,
Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 107 (2018) (discussing the announced U.S. withdrawal
from UNESCO); 112 AJIL 311 (2018) (discussing the cessation of U.S. participation in the Global Compact on
Migration); 112 AJIL 315, 320 n. 42 (2018) (noting the decision not to seek ratiﬁcation of the Trans-Paciﬁc
Partnership); 112 AJIL 514 (2018) (discussing the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA); 112 AJIL 745 (2018) (discussing the U.S. withdrawal from the UN Human Rights Council). The trend is not entirely in one direction, as
the Trump administration has also pursued the making or renegotiation of some international agreements. See,
e.g., Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 151 (2018) (discussing the renegotiated NAFTA); 113 AJIL 142 (2018) (describing the recent passage of implementing legislation for the Marrakesh
Treaty and noting more generally that from January 2017 to November 2018 the U.S. Senate advised and consented to six treaties).
1
White House Press Release, President Donald J. Trump Signs H.R. 46, H.R. 2259, H.R. 4854, H.R. 4958,
S. 791, S. 1668 and S. 2559 into Law (Oct. 10, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/
president-donald-j-trump-signs-h-r-46-h-r-2259-h-r-4854-h-r-4958-s-791-s-1668-s-2559-law [https://perma.
cc/T2CA-YEAG] [hereinafter White House Press Release].
2
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Adoption of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works
for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print Disabled (June 28, 2013), at https://2009-
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to implement copyright exceptions and limitations aimed at aiding the development of copyrighted works in accessible formats for persons with physical disabilities relating to vision or to
the process of reading books.3 The treaty also permits authorized organizations to share these
materials across borders with authorized organizations or eligible persons located on the
territory of other treaty parties.4
Although the United States has not ratiﬁed the treaty as of November 30, 2018,5 it has now
undertaken all the underlying legislative steps needed to ratify and implement it. On June 28,
2018, the U.S. Senate unanimously both gave its advice and consent to the Marrakesh Treaty
and passed legislation to implement the treaty.6 A few months later, the U.S. House of
Representatives also unanimously passed the implementing legislation, and Trump subsequently signed the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act (MTIA) into law on October 9,
2018.7 According to the U.S. Copyright Ofﬁce, the United States is in the process of preparing its formal ratiﬁcation for submission to WIPO.8
The MTIA amends the Copyright Act to expand a previous exemption that already
permitted authorized entities “to reproduce or to distribute copies or phonorecords of a previously published, nondramatic literary work if such copies or phonorecords are reproduced
or distributed in specialized formats exclusively for use by blind or other persons with disabilities.”9 Speciﬁcally, the legislation broadens the exemption to cover all literary works and
musical works “ﬁxed in the form of text or notation.”10 The act also allows such works to
be reproduced in “an alternative manner or form,” rather than limiting duplication to speciﬁc
technologies such as braille or digital text.11 Finally, the MTIA adds new provisions to the
Copyright Act focusing on the cross-border exchange feature of the Marrakesh Treaty. These
new provisions permit authorized entities to export the reproduced works as set forth in the

2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/06/211308.htm [https://perma.cc/5WG6-PHSC]; Summary of the Marrakesh
Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired, or Otherwise Print
Disabled (MVT) (2013), WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/marrakesh/
summary_marrakesh.html [https://perma.cc/5V4S-FGYP]. The United States signed the treaty on October 2,
2013. Understanding the Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFF., available at https://www.
copyright.gov/legislation/2018_marrakesh_faqs.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BKM-A8W2] [hereinafter Copyright
Ofﬁce Information Sheet].
3
Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons Who Are Blind, Visually Impaired or
Otherwise Print Disabled, Arts. 3, 4, June 27, 2013, 52 ILM 1312.
4
Id. Art. 5.
5
WIPO-Administered Treaties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.
jsp?lang=en&treaty_id=843 [https://perma.cc/7JA9-7ZKG].
6
164 CONG. REC. S109,4421 (including a declaration that the treaty is non-self-executing); S. 2559, 115th
Cong. (2018), 164 CONG. REC. S109,4810–11 (daily ed. June 28, 2018). As these sources indicate, both the treaty
and the implementing legislation came to a vote through the unanimous consent procedure in the Senate.
7
S. 2559, 115th Cong. (2018), 164 CONG. REC. H158,8838 (daily ed. September 25, 2018); White House
Press Release, supra note 1.
8
Copyright Ofﬁce Information Sheet, supra note 2, at 3 (also noting that the treaty will enter into force for the
United States ninety days after ratiﬁcation).
9
The Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act, Pub. L. No. 115-261 (to be codiﬁed as amended at 17 U.S.C. §
121); Legislative Branch Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-197, 110 Stat. 2394 (codiﬁed as amended
at 17 U.S.C. § 121).
10
The Marrakesh Treaty Implementation Act § 2(a)(1)(A).
11
Id. § 2(a)(1)(C)–(D).
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treaty12 and similarly permit authorized entities and eligible persons to import such works.13
The Marrakesh Treaty constituted one of six treaties that, as of November 15, 2018, the Senate
has approved during the 115th Congress, which began on January 3, 2017. Prior to approving
the Marrakesh Treaty, the Senate had given its advice and consent to four bilateral treaties.14
Two of these were extradition treaties with Kosovo and Serbia,15 while the other two established maritime boundaries with Micronesia and Kiribati.16 The remaining treaty to which
the Senate gave its advice and consent was an accession protocol approving Montenegro’s
entry into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).17 In addition to these treaties,
the UN Convention on the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade has been
reported out of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for consideration by the full
Senate.18

STATE DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR RELATIONS
Palestine Brings a Case Against the United States in the International Court of Justice at a Fraught
Time for U.S.-Palestinian Relations
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.112

While Palestine considers itself a state, the United States does not currently recognize it as
such. The relationship between the two has continued to deteriorate following the December
2017 announcement that the United States would recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and
move its embassy there. Alleging that the embassy relocation violates international law,
Palestine brought a case against the United States in the International Court of Justice
(ICJ) in September of 2018. The United States reacted by announcing its withdrawal
from the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations
Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (Optional Protocol). Also in the fall
of 2018, the Trump administration closed the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)
12
Id. § 2(a)(2)(a). Authorized entities are deﬁned as nonproﬁt organizations or governmental agencies with a
primary mission to serve the visually impaired or other persons with disabilities. Id., § 2(a)(2)(f).
13
Id. § 2(a)(2)(b).
14
164 CONG. REC. S126,5417–18 (daily ed. July 26, 2018) (documenting the Senate’s advice and consent to all
four of these treaties through unanimous consent and including declarations that all four treaties are selfexecuting).
15
Extradition Treaty with the Republic of Serbia, S. Treaty Doc. No. 115-1; Extradition Treaty with the
Republic of Kosovo, S. Treaty Doc. No. 115-2.
16
The Treaties with the Republic of Kiribati and the Government of the Federated States of Micronesia on the
Delimitation of Maritime Boundaries, S. Treaty Doc. No. 114-13 (including two separate treaties under a single
treaty document number).
17
Protocol to the North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 on the Accession of Montenegro, S. Treaty Doc. No. 114-12;
see also Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 111 AJIL 756,
762–64 (2017) (discussing the Senate’s approval of this protocol).
18
S. Exec. Rep. 115-7 (Sept. 12, 2018) (reporting this treaty forward with six declarations and ﬁve understandings). As of November 30, 3018, it remained be seen whether it will receive a ﬂoor vote before the term of the
current Congress ends in early January 2019.
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ofﬁce in Washington, curtailed its own Palestinian-focused mission in Jerusalem, and sharply
cut U.S. funding focused on Palestinian interests.
On December 6, 2017, President Trump recognized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and
announced that the U.S. embassy in Israel would move from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.1 Despite
objections from the Palestinians and widespread criticism from members of the UN Security
Council and General Assembly,2 on May 14, 2018, the United States ofﬁcially opened its
embassy in Jerusalem.3 On that same day, Palestine informed the United States of its view
that “any step taken by the United States to relocate its embassy to Jerusalem constitutes a
violation of the” Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) “read in conjunction
with relevant United Nations resolutions.”4 On July 4, 2018, Palestine followed up to express
its view that a dispute grounded in the VCDR and its Optional Protocol existed between the
United States and Palestine.5
On September 28, 2018, Palestine ﬁled an application to institute proceedings against the
United States in the ICJ.6 Emphasizing the special character of Jerusalem, the application
discusses the city’s legal status and notes the existence of Security Council resolutions refusing
to recognize Israel’s efforts to change this status.7 The application then turns to the VCDR
and construes it to require that any diplomatic mission be based on the territory of the “receiving state.”8 The application also notes that the VCDR prohibits a mission from being “‘used
in any manner incompatible with the functions of the mission as laid down in the present
Convention or by other rules of general international law.’”9 Synthesizing these strands,
the application argues that
[t]he relocation of the US Embassy in Israel to the Holy City of Jerusalem is in breach of
the provisions of the Convention on Diplomatic Relations mentioned above as well as,
1
For discussion of the Trump administration’s decision and responses by the international community, see Jean
Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 306 (2018).
2
Id. at 308–10.
3
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, On the Opening of U.S. Embassy Jerusalem (May 14, 2018), at
https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/05/282066.htm [https://perma.cc/GCP7-FPZG].
4
Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings,
Annexes 2018 ICJ, at 38 (Sept. 28), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/176/176-20180928APP-01-01-EN.pdf (reproducing this “note verbale” in which Palestine also requested “to be informed as soon
as possible about the steps the United States is considering to ensure its actions are in line with the” VCDR).
5
Id. at 39 (reproducing this second “note verbale”).
6
Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings,
2018 ICJ (Sept. 28), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/176/176-20180928-APP-01-00-EN.pdf
[hereinafter ICJ Application].
7
Id. at 3–5 (citing Security Council Resolutions 252, 267, 298, 476, and 478). The two most recent of these—
Resolutions 476 and 478—respectively “reconﬁrm[ed] that all legislative and administrative measures and actions
taken by Israel, the occupying power, which purport to alter the character and status of the Holy City of Jerusalem
have no legal validity” and “call[ed] upon . . . [t]hose States that have established diplomatic missions at Jerusalem
to withdraw such missions from the Holy City.” SC Res. 476 (1980); SC Res. 478 (1980).
8
ICJ Application, supra note 6, at 9–11. The VCDR uses the term “receiving state” frequently but does not
have a provision that explicitly and speciﬁcally requires a diplomatic mission to be located on the premises of the
receiving state. See generally Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, 23 UST 3227, 500
UNTS 95. The receiving state does have an obligation to “either facilitate the acquisition on its territory, in accordance with its laws, by the sending State of premises necessary for its mission or assist the latter in obtaining accommodation in some other way.” Id. Art. 21(1).
9
ICJ Application, supra note 6, at 11 (quoting VCDR Art. 41(3)).
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more generally, of its object and purpose and of “other rules of general international law”
to which the Convention refers.10
This is the ﬁrst suit brought by Palestine before the ICJ.11 It constitutes a further step by
Palestine signaling and seeking to strengthen its claim to statehood. Important to Palestine’s
ability to join the VCDR and its Optional Protocol—and therefore to develop its pathway to
ICJ jurisdiction—was a resolution passed on November 29, 2012, by the UN General
Assembly. This resolution granted Palestine non-member observer state status at the
United Nations.12 It also expressed support for a favorable decision by the UN Security
Council with regards to granting Palestine full UN membership status,13 though that has
not since occurred. The lack of full UN membership notwithstanding, the UN secretarygeneral has since accepted Palestinian instruments of accession in his role as the depository
for various multilateral agreements.14
In 2014, Palestine deposited its instrument of accession for the VCDR.15 At the time, the
United States responded by stating that
[t]he Government of the United States of America does not believe the “State of
Palestine” qualiﬁes as a sovereign State and does not recognize it as such. Accession to
the Convention is limited to sovereign States. Therefore, the Government of the
United States of America believes that the “State of Palestine” is not qualiﬁed to accede
to the Convention and afﬁrms that it will not consider itself to be in a treaty relationship
with the “State of Palestine” under the Convention.16
Palestine acceded to the Optional Protocol on March 22, 2018,17 several months after
Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. The United States once
again issued a responsive notiﬁcation citing its 2014 rejection, afﬁrming its belief in
Palestine’s lack of statehood, and stating that “the Government of the United States of
America believes that the ‘State of Palestine’ is not qualiﬁed to accede to the Optional
10

Id. at 12.
Palestine did contribute a written statement to an ICJ advisory proceeding in 2004. Legal Consequences of
the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Written Statement Submitted by Palestine,
2004 ICJ (Jan. 30), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/131/1555.pdf.
12
GA Res. 67/19, Status of Palestine in the United Nations (Dec. 4, 2012), at https://unispal.un.org/DPA/
DPR/unispal.nsf/0/19862D03C564FA2C85257ACB004EE69B.
13
Id.
14
Ofﬁce of the UN Secretary General, Note to Correspondents – Accession of Palestine to Multilateral Treaties
(Jan. 7, 2015), at https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/note-correspondents/2015-01-07/note-correspondentsaccession-palestine-multilateral (noting that “it is for States to make their own determination with respect to
any legal issues raised by instruments circulated by the Secretary-General”); see also John Cerone, The ICC and
Palestinian Consent, ASIL INSIGHT (Mar. 20, 3015), at https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/19/issue/6/icc-andpalestinian-consent (observing that in 2014 Switzerland and the Netherlands also accepted Palestinian accession to
treaties for which they serve as depositories).
15
UN Secretary-General, Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations: State of Palestine: Accession (Apr. 9,
2014), available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2014/CN.176.2014-Eng.pdf.
16
Diplomatic Note, United States Mission to the United Nations New York (May 13, 2014), available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2014/CN.256.2014-Eng.pdf.
17
UN Secretary-General, Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations Concerning
the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes: State of Palestine: Accession (Mar. 23, 2018), available at https://treaties.
un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2018/CN.149.2018-Eng.pdf (noting that the action “was effected on 22 March”).
11
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Protocol and afﬁrms that it will not consider itself to be in a treaty relationship with the ‘State
of Palestine’ under the Optional Protocol.”18
On October 3, 2018, the United States announced its withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol, making clear that the case brought by Palestine was a motivating factor in this decision.19 In a press conference making this announcement, National Security Advisor John
Bolton reiterated the U.S. rejection of Palestinian statehood:
It’s not a state now. It does not meet the customary international law test of statehood. It
doesn’t control deﬁned boundaries. It doesn’t fulﬁll the normal functions of government.
There are a whole host of reasons why it’s not a state. It could become a state, as the
President said, but that requires diplomatic negotiations with Israel and others.20
Bolton did not expressly discuss whether or how the United States would defend itself in
the pending ICJ proceedings. On November 2, the Legal Adviser to the State Department,
Jennifer Newstead, wrote to the ICJ expressing the view that the ICJ “‘manifest[ly]’” lacks
jurisdiction over the case and stating that the United States would not participate in a meeting
later that week at the ICJ regarding the case.21 On November 15, the ICJ set a brieﬁng schedule with respect to issues of jurisdiction and admissibility, calling for Palestine’s submission by
May 15, 2019, and the U.S. submission by November 15, 2019.22
The U.S. withdrawal from the Optional Protocol itself would not deprive the ICJ of jurisdiction over the case, assuming such jurisdiction existed prior to withdrawal.23 Whether such
jurisdiction exists in the ﬁrst place, however, depends on several difﬁcult issues. One is
whether Palestine is in fact a state, since the ICJ’s founding statute provides that “only states
may be parties in cases before the Court.”24 Another is what effect, if any, to give to the U.S.
declarations that it does not consider itself in a treaty relationship with Palestine for either the
VCDR or its Optional Protocol.25 Yet another is the applicability of the ICJ’s Monetary Gold
18
Diplomatic Note, United States Mission to the United Nations New York (May 1, 2018), available at
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2018/CN.228.2018-Eng.pdf.
19
For further discussion of this announced withdrawal and the legal questions surrounding its validity, see Jean
Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 113 AJIL 133 (2019).
20
White House Press Brieﬁng, Press Brieﬁng by Press Secretary Sarah Sanders, Small Business Administrator
Linda McMahon, and National Security Advisor (Oct. 3, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-state
ments/press-brieﬁng-press-secretary-sarah-sanders-small-business-administrator-linda-mcmahon-national-secur
ity-advisor-100318 [https://perma.cc/B4RU-A34K] [hereinafter October 3 Press Brieﬁng].
21
ICJ Press Release, Relocation of the United States Embassy to Jerusalem (Palestine v. U.S.) (Nov. 30, 2018), available
at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/176/176-20181130-PRE-01-00-EN.pdf (quoting the letter, which in
turn referenced the U.S. notiﬁcations made when Palestine joined the VCDR and the Optional Protocol).
22
Id.
23
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 ICJ
14, para. 36 (June 27) (measuring jurisdiction based on the time the case was ﬁled and stating that “‘[a]n extrinsic
fact such as the subsequent lapse of the Declaration [or, as in the present case also, the Treaty containing a compromissory clause], by reason of the expiry of the period or by denunciation, cannot deprive the Court of the
jurisdiction already established’”) (quoting Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1953 ICJ 111, 123
(Nov. 18)) (alteration in original).
24
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 34, para. 1.
25
“It is disputed whether such declarations may qualify as reservations as stipulated in the Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.” Stefan Talmon, The European Union – Turkey Controversy Over Cyprus or a Tale of Two
Treaty Declarations, 5 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 579, 587–89 (2006) (asserting that “[i]n practice, such declarations have
. . . been treated like reservations” and that “[t]heir legal effect thus depends on the individual treaty and, in particular, on whether the statement excluding the application of the treaty in relation to the non-recognized entity is
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principle about not adjudicating the interests of third parties without their consent.26 It
remains to be seen to what extent the United States will appear in the ICJ to contest the
case with respect to both jurisdiction and the underlying merits.
In addition to the conﬂict over the relocation of the embassy, U.S.-Palestinian relations
worsened on several other fronts over the late summer and fall of 2018. The Trump administration closed the PLO ofﬁce in Washington, downgraded its own Palestinian-focused mission in Jerusalem, and slashed U.S. funding focused on Palestinian interests.
On September 10, the State Department announced the closure of the ofﬁce of the General
Delegation of the PLO located in Washington, D.C.27 The State Department’s press release stated:
We have permitted the PLO ofﬁce to conduct operations that support the objective of
achieving a lasting, comprehensive peace between Israelis and Palestinians. . . . However,
the PLO has not taken steps to advance the start of direct and meaningful negotiations
with Israel. To the contrary, PLO leadership has condemned a U.S. peace plan they have
not yet seen and refused to engage with the U.S. government with respect to peace efforts
and otherwise. As such, and reﬂecting Congressional concerns, the Administration has
decided that the PLO ofﬁce in Washington will close at this point. This decision is also
consistent with Administration and Congressional concerns with Palestinian attempts to
prompt an investigation of Israel by the International Criminal Court.28
On October 18, the State Department announced that it would be merging the U.S.
Consulate General in Jerusalem into the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem.29 The U.S. Consulate
General had historically been devoted to Palestinian affairs, acting as a “quasi-embassy.”30
The State Department cited efﬁciency as its driving motivation for the merger.31 It stated
that the merger “does not signal a change of U.S. policy on Jerusalem, the West Bank, or the
Gaza Strip” and that “[t]he Administration is strongly committed to achieving a lasting and comprehensive peace that offers a brighter future to Israel and the Palestinians.”32
incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty”); see also John King Gamble, Jr., Reservations to
Multilateral Treaties: A Macroscopic View of State Practice, 74 AJIL 372, 388 (1980) (noting the frequency of
such declarations by Arab nations with respect to Israel).
26
Compare Marko Milanović, Palestine Sues the United States in the ICJ re Jerusalem Embassy, EJIL: TALK! (Sept.
30, 2018), at https://www.ejiltalk.org/palestine-sues-the-united-states-in-the-icj-re-jerusalem-embassy/#more16519 (suggesting that “Palestine’s claim runs headlong into the ICJ’s longstanding Monetary Gold
jurisprudence—that it will not adjudicate on claims that involve the legal interests of third parties without the
consent of those parties”—since the case “clearly involves the existence (or not) of the rights of Israel vis-à-vis
that territory, and Israel will obviously not consent to the ICJ’s determination of these rights”) with Alina
Miron, Palestine’s Application the ICJ, neither Groundless nor Hopeless. A Reply to Marko Milanović, EJIL: TALK!
(Oct. 8, 2018), at https://www.ejiltalk.org/palestines-application-the-icj-neither-groundless-nor-hopeless-areply-to-marko-mila novic/#more-16541 (suggesting that the Monetary Gold principle might not be applicable).
27
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Closure of the PLO Ofﬁce in Washington (Sept. 10, 2018), at https://www.
state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/09/285812.htm [https://perma.cc/B2PP-SCKS].
28
Id.
29
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, On the Merging of the U.S. Embassy Jerusalem and U.S. Consulate
General Jerusalem (Oct. 18, 2018), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/10/286731.htm [https://
perma.cc/75CP-4M55] [hereinafter October 18 Press Release].
30
David M. Halbﬁnger, U.S. Folding Jerusalem Consulate into Embassy, a Blow to Palestinians, N.Y. TIMES (Oct.
18, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/world/middleeast/us-palestinians-consulate-jerusalem.html.
31
October 18 Press Release, supra note 29.
32
Id.
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During the late summer and fall, the Trump administration reduced multiple streams of
U.S. funding aimed at Palestinian interests. On August 31, 2018, the State Department
announced that it would no longer provide funding for the UN Relief and Works Agency
(UNRWA),33 building on a decision in January to withhold $65 million in previously anticipated funding.34 The Department explained:
The Administration has carefully reviewed the issue and determined that the United
States will not make additional contributions to UNRWA. When we made a U.S. contribution of $60 million in January, we made it clear that the United States was no longer
willing to shoulder the very disproportionate share of the burden of UNRWA’s costs that
we had assumed for many years. . . .
Beyond the budget gap itself and failure to mobilize adequate and appropriate burden
sharing, the fundamental business model and ﬁscal practices that have marked
UNRWA for years—tied to UNRWA’s endlessly and exponentially expanding community of entitled beneﬁciaries—is simply unsustainable and has been in crisis mode for
many years. The United States will no longer commit further funding to this irredeemably ﬂawed operation.35
UNRWA provides humanitarian relief for Palestinian refugees.36 UNRWA’s deﬁnition for

who classiﬁes as a Palestinian refugee is relatively broad, covering “persons whose normal
place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who
lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conﬂict,” with services also
available to descendants of male Palestinian refugees.37 As the deﬁnition does not require that
individuals live outside occupied Palestinian territory, UNRWA states that it provides services
to registered refugees living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as well as to those living in
Jordan, Lebanon, and Syria.38 The United States had previously been the UNRWA’s largest
donor, accounting for a third of the agency’s roughly $1.1 billion donations received in
2017.39
In addition to ceasing UNRWA contributions, the Trump administration has dramatically
cut back on other Palestinian-related funding. On August 24, the administration signaled
that it would be redirecting some $200 million that had originally been budgeted to support

33
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, On U.S. Assistance to UNRWA (Aug. 31, 2018), at https://www.state.gov/
r/pa/prs/ps/2018/08/285648.htm [https://perma.cc/JNW3-DC78] [hereinafter August 31 Press Release].
34
See Galbraith, supra note 1, at 310.
35
August 31 Press Release, supra note 33.
36
UNRWA, See What We Do, at https://www.unrwa.org/what-we-do.
37
UNRWA, Palestine Refugees, at https://www.unrwa.org/palestine-refugees.
38
UNRWA, Where We Work, at https://www.unrwa.org/where-we-work.
39
UNRWA, 2017 Pledges to UNRWA’s Programmes (Cash and In-kind) – Overall Donor Ranking as [of] 31
December 2017, available at https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/ﬁles/overalldonor_ranking.pdf. Since 2009 the
United States has been the number one contributor to UNRWA, with U.S. contributions peaking in 2015 at
$380,593,116. UNRWA, Pledges to UNRWA (Cash and In-kind) for 2015 – Overall Donor Ranking in USD
as [of] 31 December 2015, available at https://www.unrwa.org/sites/default/ﬁles/2015_donors_ranking_over
all.pdf. For more data on U.S. contributions since 2008, see UNRWA, Donor Charts, at https://www.unrwa.
org/how-you-can-help/government-partners/funding-trends/donor-charts.
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programs in the West Bank and Gaza.40 On September 8, the administration redirected $25
million that was originally intended for East Jerusalem hospitals caring for Palestinians.41 On
September 14, the United States Agency for International Development indicated that it
would no longer use a pre-budgeted $10 million for programs meant to bolster relationships
between Palestinians and Israelis, and instead would focus only on programs supporting
Israeli Jews and Arabs.42 Finally, in October, Trump signed the Anti-Terrorism
Clariﬁcation Act of 2018, which could have further substantial future impacts on U.S. funding in relation to Palestine.43
Collectively, these cuts in funding are reported to reﬂect a Trump administration aim of
“maximum negotiating leverage over the Palestinians.”44 The UNRWA cuts in particular
appear aimed at inﬂuencing the role that the potential right of return for refugees has played
in peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians. Mustafa Barghouti, the current secretarygeneral of the Palestinian National Initiative, has observed that the United States “‘tried to
liquidate the issue of Jerusalem by saying they were removing it from the negotiating table,
now they want to kill UNRWA with the aim of killing the right of the Palestinian refugees to
return to their homeland.’”45 For its part, UNRWA expressed dismay at the U.S. decision and
the perceived purpose underlying it. Its Commissioner-General, Pierre Krähenbühl,
described the U.S. decision to cease funding as “an evident politicization of humanitarian
aid” that “risks undermining the foundations of the international multi-lateral and humanitarian systems.”46

40

David Brunnstrom, Trump Cuts More Than $200 Million in U.S. Aid to Palestinians, REUTERS (Aug. 24,
2018), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-palestinians/trump-cuts-more-than-200-million-in-u-s-aid-topalestinians-idUSKCN1L923C.
41
Trump Cuts $25 Million in Aid for Palestinians in East Jerusalem Hospitals, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2018), at https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-palestinians-hospitals/trump-axes-25-million-in-aid-for-palestinians-in-eastjerusalem-hospitals-idUSKCN1LO0O0.
42
Edward Wong, U.S. Is Ending Final Source of Aid for Palestinian Civilians, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14, 2018), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/14/world/middleeast/us-aid-palestinian-civilians.html.
43
Pub. L. 115-253, __ Stat. __ (2018) (providing among other things that as a condition of accepting U.S.
funding, defendants to civil actions alleging injury based on international terrorism must accept personal jurisdiction in these actions). For a discussion of this act and its sizeable implications for the PLO, see Harry Graver &
Scott R. Anderson, Shedding Light on the Anti-Terrorism Clariﬁcation Act of 2018, LAWFARE (Oct. 25, 2018), at
https://www.lawfareblog.com/shedding-light-anti-terrorism-clariﬁcation-act-2018; see also Robbie Gramer &
Colum Lynch, U.S. Mulls End to Remaining Aid Programs for Palestinians, FOR. POL’Y (Nov. 30, 2018), at
https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/11/30/new-law-could-end-u-s-aid-programs-to-the-palestinians-u-s-agency-forinternational-development-terrorist-law-humanitarian-aid-united-nations-relief-works-agency-unrwa-westbank-gaza-protests-trump-ku (noting that the Trump administration has developed concerns about the effects of
this law and may seek to amend it).
44
Wong, supra note 42.
45
Wishing Away Palestinian Refugees: End of US’ UNRWA Aid Explained, AL JAZEERA (Sept. 2, 2018), at https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/09/unrwa-funding-cut-deeply-regrettable-shocking-180901071620633.html
(adding that “‘[t]his will fail’”). The number of refugees is relevant to ongoing negotiations regarding a potential
right of return, and Israel has been critical of UNRWA for how it deﬁnes refugees. Id.
46
UNRWA Press Release, Open Letter from UNRWA Commissioner-General to Palestine Refugees and
UNRWA Staff (Sept. 1, 2018), at https://www.unrwa.org/newsroom/ofﬁcial-statements/open-letter-unrwa-com
missioner-general-palestine-refugees-and-unrwa.
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INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW
NAFTA Is Renegotiated and Signed by the United States
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A twenty-four-year-old agreement was reborn on October 1, 2018, when President Trump
announced that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had been successfully
renegotiated. The deal came after an arduous, year-long negotiation process that almost left
Canada behind. As one indicator of its contentiousness, the deal lacks an agreed-upon name,
but the United States is referring to it as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement
(USMCA).1 It keeps some key NAFTA provisions mostly the same, including with respect
to state-to-state dispute resolution, but eliminates, modiﬁes, and adds other provisions.
Among the changes: investor-state dispute settlement has been eliminated as between the
United States and Canada; rules of origin for automobiles and rules for U.S. dairy products
have been modiﬁed; and new provisions address labor protections, intellectual property
rights, rights for indigenous persons, rules for trade negotiations with non-market countries,
and the agreement’s termination. The agreement was formally signed by the leaders of all
three countries on November 30, 3018. It must be approved through the domestic ratiﬁcation procedures of the three countries before it enters into force.
Signed in 1992 by Canada, Mexico, and the United States, NAFTA went into effect in
1994 and lifted tariffs on many goods traded between the three countries.2 It sought to
build “an expanded and secure market for the goods and services produced in” the three countries and to “eliminate barriers to trade in, and facilitate the cross-border movement of, goods
and services between” these countries.3 Twenty-two years later during Trump’s presidential
campaign, he called NAFTA “the worst trade deal in history” and promised to renegotiate it.4
U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer began formal NAFTA renegotiations on
August 16, 2017.5 By November of that year, the United States, Canada, and Mexico had
gone through ﬁve rounds of negotiations for an updated NAFTA, and strong disagreements
remained over automobiles and a sunset clause, among others.6 The United States wanted to
increase the threshold for automobiles that needed to be manufactured in North America in
order to qualify for zero tariffs from 62.5 percent to 85 percent, while Mexico and Canada
thought these new rules of origin would be problematic.7 The United States also demanded a
1
Daniel Dale, USMCA? CUSMA? What the New NAFTA is Called Depends on Who’s Talking, STAR (Nov. 30,
2018), at https://www.thestar.com/news/world/2018/11/30/usmca-cusma-what-the-new-nafta-is-calleddepends-on-whos-talking.html (noting that Canadian leaders have described it as “the new NAFTA” and that
Canada ofﬁcially calls it the CUSMA, while Mexico terms it the T-MEC).
2
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 ILM 289 [hereinafter NAFTA Text].
3
Id. pmbl., Art. 102(1)(a).
4
Full transcript: Donald Trump’s Jobs Plan Speech, POLITICO (June 28, 2016), at https://www.politico.com/
story/2016/06/full-transcript-trump-job-plan-speech-224891.
5
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Press Release, USTR Releases Updated NAFTA Negotiating Objectives (Nov.
2017), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/press-ofﬁce/press-releases/2017/november/ustr-releasesupdated-nafta# [https://perma.cc/HBM6-DB3A].
6
Ana Swanson & Elisabeth Malkin, Nafta Round Closes with Talks Bogged Down by Conﬂict, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
21, 2017), at https://nyti.ms/2hPJsxG.
7
Id.
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sunset clause which would require that the agreement expire every ﬁve years unless all three
countries agreed to renew.8 During the course of negotiations, Trump threatened “that if
[NAFTA] doesn’t work out, we’ll terminate it,” although his domestic legal authority to take
such an act is not fully settled.9 Negotiations continued into the spring and summer of 2018.10
In June 2018, Trump elaborated on why he thought the original NAFTA deal could not
stand and introduced an alternative idea to the trilateral deal:
Well, NAFTA—look, it’s been a terrible deal for the United States. People are starting to
see it. We lose over a hundred billion dollars a year with Mexico. We lose many, many,
many billions of dollars with Canada. Canada doesn’t take—I mean, they’re very restrictive as to taking our agricultural product and other things.
...
. . . To be honest with you, I wouldn’t see NAFTA—I wouldn’t mind seeing NAFTA,
where you’d go by a different name, where you make a separate deal with Canada and
a separate deal with Mexico, because you’re talking about a very different two countries.11
Trade tensions continued to rise when Trump decided to impose 25 percent steel tariffs and
10 percent aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico, partly for the purpose of pressuring them to
agree to U.S. negotiating demands.12 Both countries imposed responsive tariffs and emphasized
the need for a trilateral deal.13 The rift in U.S.-Canadian relations deepened when Trump
tweeted after leaving the G7 Conference that Trudeau was “[v]ery dishonest & weak.”14
8

Id.
Donald J. Trump, Remarks on Signing Proclamations on Imports of Large Residential Washers and Certain
Photovoltaic Cells and an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 43, at 2 (Jan. 23); see Jean
Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 315, 321 n. 48 (noting the debates over
Trump’s domestic legal authority to terminate NAFTA and over the extent to which such a termination would
affect NAFTA’s implementing legislation).
10
In the process, the negotiators overshot a May deadline given by the speaker of the House of Representatives
for ensuring that any new deal would be voted on by the then-current Congress. See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary
Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 510, 512–13 (2018) (discussing these timing issues).
11
Donald J. Trump, Remarks Following a Meeting with Vice Chairman of the State Affairs Commission Kim
Yong Chol North Korea and an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 392, at 6 (June 1).
The extent of the U.S. trade deﬁcit or surplus with Canada is more complicated than Trump’s statement implied.
See, e.g., Flora Carr, President Trump Claims the United States Has a Trade Deﬁcit with Canada. That’s Not So Clear,
TIME (Mar. 15, 2018), at http://time.com/5185673/donald-trump-us-cananda-trade-deﬁcit-surplus (noting in
response to a similar earlier statement by Trump that the United States runs a trade surplus with Canada if
one discounts goods that are manufactured elsewhere in the world but pass through Canada on their way to
the United States).
12
Ana Swanson & Jim Tankersley, Mexico, Hitting Back, Imposes Tariffs on $3 Billion Worth of U.S. Goods, N.Y.
TIMES (June 5, 2018), at https://nyti.ms/2xTW8Lp. For discussion of other countries targeted by these tariffs,
ongoing requests for World Trade Organization (WTO) consultations with respect to the tariffs and retaliatory
measures, and U.S. domestic legal disputes concerning the tariffs, see Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of
the United States, 112 AJIL 751, 754–57 (2018).
13
Swanson & Tankersley, supra note 12; Can. Dept. of Fin., Countermeasures in Response to Unjustiﬁed
Tariffs on Canadian Steel and Aluminum Products, at https://www.ﬁn.gc.ca/access/tt-it/cacsap-cmpcaa-1-eng.
asp [https://perma.cc/MTZ8-X8K6] (last modiﬁed June 29, 2018); Anthony Harrup, Mexico and Canada Are
Committed to a Trilateral Deal, WALL ST. J. (July 25, 2018), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/mexico-and-canada-are-committed-to-a-trilateral-nafta-deal-1532545283.
14
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (June 9, 2018, 7:04 PM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1005586562959093760 [https://perma.cc/SP3Y-GU3F].
9
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Early August brought in a new U.S. Department of Commerce announcement that it
would proceed with tariffs on a Canadian newsprint exporter,15 and the United States and
Mexico began to make headway in negotiations without Canada.16 This progress took place
in light of the approaching end to President Enrique Peña Nieto’s term on November 30,
when he would be replaced by Andrés Manuel López Obrador.17 Because U.S. congressional
law effectively required Trump to give ninety days’ notice before signing an agreement, any
deal that would be signed by Peña Nieto before he left ofﬁce needed to be announced by the
end of August.18
After weeks of forward-moving negotiations, Trump announced on August 27 that the
United States and Mexico had reached an agreement on key provisions, adding that he
wanted to call it the “United States-Mexico Trade Agreement,” due to the “bad connotation”
associated with the NAFTA name.19 Peña Nieto conﬁrmed on a phone call with the White
House that it was Mexico’s wish “that now Canada will also be able to be incorporated in all
this.”20 Trump responded during the call that “Canada will start negotiations shortly . . . and
if they’d like to negotiate fairly, we’ll do that.”21 The White House claimed after Trump’s
announcement that “[t]his is the ﬁrst time that a modern United States trade agreement
has been renegotiated.”22
On August 31, Trump ofﬁcially gave notice to Congress of his “intention to enter into a
trade agreement with Mexico—and with Canada if it is willing.”23 As Mexico and the United
States began to work to include Canada in the deal, it became unclear whether they would
succeed. As part of its negotiating approach, Canada had earlier set forth four “progressive”
goals of strong labor safeguards, provisions for gender equality, provisions for indigenous

15
U.S. Dep’t of Commerce Fact Sheet, Commerce Finds Dumping and Subsidization of Imports of Uncoated
Groundwood Paper from Canada (Aug. 2, 2018), available at https://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-canada-uncoated-groundwood-paper-ad-cvd-ﬁnal-080218.pdf [https://perma.cc/EN4G-33XF].
These tariffs were not ultimately applied. Uncoated Groundwood Paper from Canada, Inv. Nos. 701-TA-584,
731-TA-1382, USITC Pub. 4822 (Sept. 2018) (Final).
16
Ana Swanson, United States and Mexico Are Nearing Nafta Compromise, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2018), at https://
nyti.ms/2OagjYq.
17
Id.
18
Id.; see also 19 U.S.C. § 4205(a)(1)(A) (providing as a condition of the fast-track process for legislative
approval that the president must notify Congress of his intention to sign a trade agreement ninety calendar
days before doing so).
19
Remarks During a Teleconference Call with President Enrique Peña Nieto of Mexico to Discuss the United
States-Mexico Trade Agreement and an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 548, at 1
(Aug. 27).
20
Id.
21
Id. at 2.
22
White House Fact Sheet, President Donald J. Trump Is Keeping His Promise to Renegotiate NAFTA (Aug.
27, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/president-donald-j-trump-keeping-promiserenegotiate-nafta [https://perma.cc/ZV8D-JGNF]. In this preliminary agreement, Mexico and the United
States reportedly agreed that at least 75% of an automobile’s value would have to be manufactured in North
America in order to qualify for zero tariffs and that 40–45% of the cars had to be made by workers earning
$16 an hour. Ana Swanson, Katie Rogers, & Alan Rappeport, Trump Reaches Revised Trade Deal with Mexico,
Threatening to Leave Out Canada, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 27, 2018), at https://nyti.ms/2oe6sGn. Instead of
Trump’s ﬁve-year sunset clause, the two countries reportedly also agreed to “a review of the trade pact every six
years that would extend its lifetime for 16 more years.” Id.
23
Notice of Intention to Enter into a Trade Agreement, 83 Fed. Reg. 45191 (Aug. 31, 2018).
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rights, and provisions for climate change.24 The threat of potential U.S. tariffs on automobiles
—an issue into which the Department of Commerce had opened an investigation in
May25—was reportedly an important piece of negotiating leverage for the Trump
administration.26
Hurried negotiations commenced. Trump took particular issue with Canada’s 300 percent
tariffs on dairy products,27 while Trudeau stated that a “‘red line’” for Canada was an independent dispute resolution system because Trump is “‘a president that doesn’t always follow
the rules as they’re laid out.’”28 Although both leaders publicly asserted that they would be
willing to walk away from any deal that did not meet their objectives,29 Canada’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Chrystia Freeland, continued to meet with U.S. negotiators and reported that
the atmosphere was “constructive and positive.”30 Members of Congress remained vocal
about their desire for a three-country agreement.31
After a fraught negotiating process, Canada, the United States, and Mexico ﬁnally agreed
to a deal on October 1, allowing the text to be published sixty days before signature at the end
of November.32 Following the “legal scrub” of the agreement, the ﬁnal text was signed on
November 30 by the leaders of all three countries during a G-20 summit.33 The text
24
Chrystia Freeland, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Can., Address by Foreign Affairs Minister on the
Modernization of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (Aug. 14, 2017), at https://www.canada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2017/08/address_by_foreignaffairsministeronthemodernizationofthenorthame.
html.
25
Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 499, 504 (2018).
26
Jack Ewing, Ana Swanson & Motoko Rich, Specter of Trump’s Car Tariffs Forces Allies to Give Ground in
Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), at https://nyti.ms/2NxhDoz.
27
Remarks Prior to a Meeting with Amir Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah of Kuwait and an Exchange with
Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 574, at 4 (Sept. 5).
28
Alan Rappeport, As Nafta Talks Resume, U.S. and Canada Aren’t Budging on Key Priorities, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
5, 2018), at https://nyti.ms/2CiMQdQ.
29
Trudeau stated that Canada would “walk away and not sign a deal rather than sign a bad deal for Canadians.”
Id. Similarly, Trump tweeted “[t]here is no political necessity to keep Canada in the new NAFTA deal. If we don’t
make a fair deal for the U.S. after decades of abuse, Canada will be out. Congress should not interfere w/ these
negotiations or I will simply terminate NAFTA entirely & we will be far better off. . . .” Donald J. Trump
(@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Sept. 1, 2018, 11:03 AM):at https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/
1035905988682018816 [https://perma.cc/ZG3M-FUUU].
30
Rappeport, supra note 28.
31
As an example, Rep. Kevin Brady (R-Tex.) stated that “[e]veryone’s desire is for this to be a three-country
agreement.” David J. Lynch, Damian Paletta & Erica Werner, U.S. All but Certain to Miss Weekend Deadline to
Include Canada in Three-Way NAFTA Deal, WASH. POST (Sept. 25, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
business/economy/us-all-but-certain-to-miss-weekend-deadline-to-include-canada-in-three-way-nafta-deal/
2018/09/25/08fc600c-c0d4-11e8-90c9-23f963eea204_story.html?utm_term=.2811af7fab39. Senator Ron
Wyden (D-Or.) remarked that “[i]t would be a monumental mistake to do this without Canada.” Alan
Rappeport & Jim Tankersley, Congress Uneasy as Trump Moves to Revise Nafta Without Canada, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 27, 2018), at https://nyti.ms/2NLKNV5.
32
White House Fact Sheet, President Donald J. Trump Secures a Modern, Rebalanced Trade Agreement with
Canada and Mexico (Oct. 1, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/president-donald-jtrump-secures-modern-rebalanced-trade-agreement-canada-mexico [https://perma.cc/CM6U-WB44]; see also
19 U.S.C. § 4205(a)(1)(B) (providing as a condition of the fast-track process for legislative approval that the president must publish the text of the agreement sixty days before signing it).
33
Dan Bilefsky, Trade Pact Is Signed at G-20, but Rift Remains for Trump and Trudeau, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 30,
2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/30/world/europe/usmca-trump-justin-trudeau.html; see also Franz
Christian Ebert & Pedro A. Villarreal, The Renegotiated “NAFTA”: What Is in It for Labor Rights, EJIL: TALK! (Oct.
11, 2018), at https://www.ejiltalk.org/category/international-labour-law (noting after the earlier release of the preliminary text that “extensive legal ‘scrubbing’” lay ahead).
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ultimately contained thirty-four chapters, four separate annexes, and thirteen side-letters.34 It
made some alterations, deletions, and additions to the original NAFTA, while keeping other
terms the same. Some provisions mirrored language from the Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership
(TPP), a multilateral trade agreement that the Obama administration had negotiated but
which Trump chose to withdraw the United States from rather than seek congressional
approval for ratiﬁcation.35 The agreement provisions did not resolve all ongoing trade disputes. Notably, U.S. aluminum and steel tariffs on Canada and Mexico remained in
place36 along with Canada’s and Mexico’s respective retaliatory tariffs.37
Regarding a sunset provision, the USMCA settled on a sixteen-year agreement that would
be up for review every six years.38 At the end of each six-year period,
[E]ach Party shall conﬁrm, in writing, through its head of government, if it wishes to
extend the term of this Agreement for another 16-year period. If each Party conﬁrms
its desire to extend this Agreement, the term of this Agreement shall be automatically
extended for another 16 years and the Commission shall conduct a joint review and consider extension of this Agreement term no later than at the end of the next six-year
period.39
If a party does not conﬁrm its wish to extend the deal for another sixteen years, then the parties
must review the agreement each year for the remainder of the sixteen-year term.40 Separate
from the termination provision, the agreement also allows for a party to withdraw from the
agreement six months after it provides written notice to the other parties, allowing the agreement to remain in place with respect to the other two countries.41
Several of Canada’s progressive goals were reﬂected in the negotiated agreement. Regarding
indigenous rights, which were not previously addressed in NAFTA, the USMCA reads:
34
Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep., United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement Text, at https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between [hereinafter
USMCA Text]. The draft text reached in October had contained one fewer side letter. See https://perma.cc/
4PEB-TTJR (archiving the table of contents for this draft text).
35
See, e.g., Anupam Chander, The Coming North American Digital Trade Zone, CFR (Oct. 9, 2018), at https://
www.cfr.org/blog/coming-north-american-digital-trade-zone (noting that “USMCA negotiators used the TPP’s
electronic commerce chapter as the basis for negotiations” on various issues related to the digital economy).
36
Trump remarked that steel and aluminum tariffs on Canada and Mexico would remain in place “[u]ntil such
time as we can do something that would be different—like quotas, perhaps . . . .” Remarks on the United StatesMexico-Canada Agreement and an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 656, at 12-13
(Oct. 1) [hereinafter Remarks on the USMCA].
37
Rebecca Joseph, Steel Tariffs “Staying” Despite New Trade Deal: Trump, GLOB. NEWS (Oct. 1, 2018), at
https://globalnews.ca/news/4504147/donald-trump-steel-tariffs-usmca.
38
USMCA Text, supra note 34, Art. 34.7.
39
Id. Art. 34.7, para. 3; see also https://perma.cc/7XUV-TT37 (archiving the almost identical draft text). The
language here is not entirely clear as to whether the 16-year period that is generated by an agreement to renew at the
six-year mark is in addition to the remaining ten years of the agreement or instead a substitute for it. Canada has
used the term “rolling 16-year period” to describe this provision. Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement
(CUSMA): Review and Ongoing Modernization Provision Summary, at https://www.international.gc.ca/tradecommerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/cusma-aceum/modernization-modernisation.aspx?
lang=eng (last modiﬁed Nov. 29, 2018).
40
Id. Art. 34.7, para. 4.
41
Id. Art. 34.6. This is almost the same language as the withdrawal provision in NAFTA. See NAFTA Text, supra
note 2, Art. 2205.
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Provided that such measures are not used as a means of arbitrary or unjustiﬁed discrimination against persons of the other Parties or as a disguised restriction on trade in goods,
services, and investment, this Agreement does not preclude a Party from adopting or maintaining a measure it deems necessary to fulﬁll its legal obligations to indigenous peoples.42
Also going beyond the original NAFTA, the USMCA seeks to eliminate workplace discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity:
The Parties recognize the goal of eliminating discrimination in employment and occupation, and support the goal of promoting equality of women in the workplace.
Accordingly, each Party shall implement policies that it considers appropriate to protect
workers against employment discrimination on the basis of sex (including with regard to
sexual harassment), pregnancy, sexual orientation, gender identity, and caregiving
responsibilities; provide job-protected leave for birth or adoption of a child and care of
family members; and protect against wage discrimination.43
A footnote to this provision states that “[t]he United States’ existing federal agency policies
regarding the hiring of federal workers are sufﬁcient to fulﬁll the obligations set forth in this
Article.”44
The agreement also heeds Canada’s request to keep an independent state-to-state dispute
resolution process.45 As one commentator has pointed out, the provisions for choosing panelists in a dispute remain largely unchanged from NAFTA and are similar to the panelist provisions drafted in the TPP.46 Although state-to-state dispute mechanisms are mostly left intact,
the new deal eliminates investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) for Canada.47 It maintains
42
USMCA Text, supra note 34, Art. 32.5; see also https://perma.cc/324H-EMT7 (archiving the quite similar
draft text). The agreement also contains provisions concerning protection of non-national migrant workers. Id.
Art. 23.8.
43
Id. Art. 23.9; see also https://perma.cc/3CMM-BF2H (archiving the draft text, which used more emphatic
language). NAFTA did not provide any chapter for labor provisions, NAFTA Text, supra note 2, but was supplemented with the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC). North American Agreement on
Labor Cooperation, Nov. 1, 1993, 32 ILM 1499. The NAALC included a “guiding principle” that the parties
should promote the “[e]limination of employment discrimination on such grounds as race, religion, age, sex or
other grounds . . . .” Id. at Annex 1, para. 7. The TPP labor chapter does not provide similar provisions. See Ofﬁce
of the U.S. Trade Rep., TPP Full Text, at ch. 19, at https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
trans-paciﬁc-partnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/BG7H-J3ZM] [hereinafter TPP Text].
44
USMCA Text, supra note 34, Art. 23.9. This footnote was added during the legal scrub, having been absent from
the original draft text. See https://perma.cc/3CMM-BF2H (archiving the draft text).
45
USMCA Text, supra note 34, at ch. 31.
46
Simon Lester, The U.S.-Mexico-Canada (AKA the New NAFTA) Trade Deal: State-State Dispute Settlement,
INT’L L. & ECON. POL’Y (Oct. 2, 2018), at https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/10/the-us-mexicocanada-and-nafta-trade-deal-state-state-dispute-settlement.html; Simon Lester, Panel Appointments and Rosters in
the New NAFTA, INT’L L. & ECON. POL’Y (Oct. 26, 2018), at https://worldtradelaw.typepad.com/ielpblog/2018/
10/panel-appointment-and-rosters-in-the-new-nafta.html.
47
IAN F. FERGUSSON & M. ANGELES VILLARREAL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10997, PROPOSED U.S.-MEXICOCANADA (USMCA) TRADE AGREEMENT 1 (2018); cf. TPP Text, supra note 43, Art. 9.18–.30 [https://perma.cc/
H54L-5NTE] (including some provisions on ISDS). When Trump withdrew from the TPP, the other TPP
Parties, including Canada and Mexico, negotiated a new agreement without the United States which incorporated
many of the original TPP provisions. Gov. Can., Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Paciﬁc
Partnership (CPTPP), at http://international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agracc/cptpp-ptpgp/text-texte/index.aspx?lang=eng [https://perma.cc/2S9A-LA69] (last modiﬁed Mar. 3, 2018).
When the CPTPP enters into force, it will allow for some ISDS between Canada and Mexico, although its
terms on ISDS are effectively more limited than were those in the original TPP. Id. Art. 2 & Annex [https://
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ISDS “only between the United States and Mexico for claimants regarding government contracts in the oil, natural gas, power generation, infrastructure, and telecommunications sectors;
and maintain[s] U.S.-Mexico ISDS in other sectors provided the claimant exhausts national
remedies ﬁrst.”48
With regard to automobiles, the three countries agreed that 75 percent of every automobile
must be made in North America in order to qualify for duty-free treatment.49 The agreement
also provides that up to 40 percent of automobile parts manufactured for vehicles receiving dutyfree treatment must come from factories paying workers at least $16 an hour.50 Additionally, the
new agreement contains a chapter covering intellectual property rights among the three countries, which includes ten years of data protection for biological drugs, and standards against the
circumvention of technological protection measures for digital works.51
Trump announced that the agreement was “the most important trade deal we’ve ever made
by far,” remarking:
It’s my great honor to announce that we have successfully completed negotiations on a
brandnew [sic] deal to terminate and replace NAFTA and the NAFTA trade agreements
with an incredible new U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement, called “USMCA.”
...
I have to, certainly, give my highest regards to Prime Minister of Canada, Justin Trudeau.
A lot of stories came out about Justin and I having difﬁculty together, and we did over the
trade deal. But I’ll tell you, it’s turned out to be a very, very good deal for both; and a very,
very good deal for all three. It puts us in a position that we’ve never been in before.
...
Once approved by Congress, this new deal will be the most modern, up-to-date, and
balanced trade agreement in the history of our country, with the most advanced protections
for workers ever developed. . . . Likewise, it will be the most advanced trade deal in the world
with ambitious provisions on the digital economy, patents—very important—ﬁnancial services, and other areas where the United States has a strong competitive advantage. . . .52
perma.cc/34QY-6LLJ] (providing that certain TPP provisions related to ISDS are suspended “until the Parties
agree to end suspension”); see also Can. Gov., Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Paciﬁc
Partnership (CPTPP) – Frequently Asked Questions: What Speciﬁc Improvements Did Canada Seek in the
CPTPP?, at https://www.international.gc.ca/trade-commerce/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/agr-acc/
cptpp-ptpgp/faq.aspx?lang=eng (last modiﬁed Oct. 25, 2018) (“Canada secured important suspensions to limit
the scope of investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) provisions.”).
48
FERGUSSON & VILLARREAL, supra note 47; USMCA Text, supra note 34, at ch. 14, Annex 14-D [https://perma.
cc/AJP3-P57R].
49
USMCA Text, supra note 34, at ch. 4 (also setting forth a phase-in period and certain further speciﬁcations);
Remarks on the USMCA, supra note 36, at 3.
50
USMCA Text, supra note 34, at ch. 4, Annex Art. 4-B.7; Jim Tankersley, Trump Just Ripped Up Nafta. Here’s
What’s in the New Deal., N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2018), at https://nyti.ms/2OsZvQq.
51
USMCA Text, supra note 34, at ch. 20. For more information about the new intellectual property provisions,
see Ofﬁce of the U.S. Trade Rep. Fact Sheet, United States–Mexico–Canada Trade Fact Sheet: Modernizing
NAFTA into a 21st Century Trade Agreement (Oct. 2018), at https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-ofﬁces/pressofﬁce/fact-sheets/2018/october/united-states%E2%80%93mexico%E2%80%93canada-trade-fa-1 [https://
perma.cc/A5ZB-MTMV].
52
Remarks on the USMCA, supra note 36, at 1-2.
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For Canada, the agreement did require one big concession: allowing U.S. dairy access up to
3.59 percent of Canada’s dairy market; however, this concession is only slightly higher than
what the United States and Canada had agreed to under the TPP.53 Trudeau responded that
dairy producers will be compensated for their losses, but that Canada is “in a much more
stable place than it was yesterday.”54
Another notable provision in the USMCA that did not appear in NAFTA concerns free
trade agreements with a “non-market” country, deﬁned as a country that “on the date of
signature of this Agreement, a Party has determined to be a non-market economy for purposes
of its trade remedy laws” and as to which “no Party has signed a free trade agreement.”55
The USMCA requires that “[a]t least 3 months prior to commencing negotiations, a Party
shall inform the other Parties of its intention to commence free trade negotiations with a
non-market country.”56 The USMCA further requires various information-sharing in the
event of such negotiations and explicitly provides that entry into a free trade agreement
with a non-market country constitutes grounds for the other parties to terminate the
USMCA on six months notice with respect to that party.57 This “non-market” country
provision is thought to have been written with China in mind.58
By the terms of an accompanying protocol, the USMCA will enter into force “on the ﬁrst
day of the third month” after all three countries have notiﬁed each other that they have “completed the internal procedures” needed for entry into force.59 For the United States, these
procedures will require submission of the USMCA to Congress and the subsequent passage
of implementing legislation.
53

USMCA Text, supra note 34, at ch. 2; FERGUSSON & VILLARREAL, supra note 47 (explaining increase in access
to Canadian dairy market); Rod Nickel, Canada Dairy Farmers Content As TPP Deal Keeps System Intact, REUTERS
(Oct. 5, 2015), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-tpp-canada-farming-idUSKCN0RZ25E20151005
(noting that the TPP had provided the United States and other TPP countries access to 3.25% of Canada’s
dairy market).
54
Selena Ross, With New Trade Deal, Canada Avoids a Doomsday Scenario. But Is It a Win?, WASH. POST (Oct. 1,
2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/the_americas/with-new-trade-deal-canada-avoids-a-doomsdayscenario-but-is-it-a-win/2018/10/01/304d7968-c5a0-11e8-9c0f-2ffaf6d422aa_story.html?utm_term=.
24e084d6e264.
55
USMCA Text, supra note 34, Art. 32.10(1). For the earlier draft text of Article 32.10, see https://perma.cc/
324H-EMT7 (archiving this draft text).
56
Id. Art. 32.10(2).
57
Id. Art. 32.10(3)–(8).
58
See, e.g., Chad P. Brown, The 5 Surprising Things About the New USMCA Trade Agreement, WASH. POST (Oct. 9,
2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2018/10/09/the-5-surprising-things-aboutthe-new-usmca-trade-agreement/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ce0fffd71871 (“Article 32.10 signals the consequences of negotiating a potential free-trade agreement with any nonmarket economies—that is a code word for
‘China’”); David Lawder, Trade Pact Clause Seen Deterring China Trade Deal with Canada, Mexico, REUTERS (Oct.
3, 2018), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-trade-nafta-china/trade-pact-clause-seen-deterring-china-trade-dealwith-canada-mexico-idUSKCN1MC305 (“The clause, which has stirred controversy in Canada, ﬁts in with U.S.
President Donald Trump’s efforts to isolate China economically and prevent Chinese companies from using
Canada or Mexico as a ‘back door’ to ship products tariff-free to the United States.”).
59
Protocol Replacing the North American Free Trade Agreement with the Agreement Between the United
States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, at https://ustr.gov/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/agreements/FTA/USMCA/Text/USMCA_Protocol.pdf (further providing that entry into force shall have the effect
of superseding NAFTA (except as incorporated into the USMCA) and shall trigger the termination of the North
American Agreement on Labor Cooperation); see also USMCA Text, supra note 34, Art. 34.5 (cross-referencing the
Protocol). The draft text of the USMCA set similar timing rules for the entry into force but did not rely on a
separate protocol. See https://perma.cc/7XUV-TT37 (archiving the draft text).
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Pursuant to the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of
2015,60 the president must submit the “ﬁnal legal text” of the agreement and a “draft statement of any administrative action proposed to implement the agreement” to Congress at least
thirty days before submitting an implementing bill.61 Once the implementing bill is submitted (and in the absence of speciﬁed mechanisms for disapproval), it will receive an up-ordown vote in both the House or the Senate within several months.62 As of December 11,
2018, President Trump had not yet made the submission to Congress.
Viewing the agreement as a success, Lighthizer outlined three pillars of trade negotiation
that he believes the USMCA provides a model for in the future:
The ﬁrst pillar is fairness. We have negotiated stronger rules of origin for automobiles,
which will bring billions of dollars of manufacturing back to America. We have secured
greater market access for our farmers and ranchers. We’ve agreed to unprecedented labor
standards that will help level the playing ﬁeld for our workers. We’ve also agreed to a ﬁrstof-its-kind review and termination provision, which will ensure that the USMCA, unlike
NAFTA, will not become unbalanced and out of date.
The second pillar will consist of a host of ambitious provisions on digital trade; intellectual property; services, including ﬁnancial services, designed to protect our competitive
edge.
The third pillar consists of new provisions designed to eliminate unfair trade practices,
including strong new disciplines on state-owned enterprises, on currency manipulation,
relations with nonmarket economies, and much, much more.63
The new USMCA was not the only progress in trade that Trump has recently achieved, and
he has stated that he expects to “top it with China or EU or something.”64 On September 24,
2018, Trump and President Moon Jae-In of South Korea issued a joint statement announcing that they had reached a negotiated agreement “to improve the United States-[South]
Korea Free Trade Agreement,” solidifying an understanding reached the prior spring.65
Also in September, Japan agreed to begin negotiating a bilateral trade agreement with the
60
Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-26, 129 Stat. 320
(codiﬁed at 19 U.S.C §§ 4201–10).
61
19 U.S.C. § 4205(a)(1)(D)–(E). Prior to submitting the implementing legislation to Congress, the executive
branch typically consults with the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee on the
content of this legislation through what is known as the “mock markup” process. IAN F. FERGUSSON &
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43491, TRADE PROMOTION AUTHORITY (TPA): FREQUENTLY
ASKED QUESTIONS 25–26 (Sept. 4, 2018).
62
19 U.S.C. § 2191 (setting out the process, which allows for up to forty-ﬁve days for the implementing legislation to be in committee and another ﬁfteen days for the ﬂoor vote to occur, with only days that the chamber is in
session counting for these timing purposes); see also FERGUSSON & DAVIS, supra note 61, at 24–25 (discussing
mechanisms for disapproval by which this process can be altered).
63
Remarks on the USMCA, supra note 36, at 8.
64
Donald J. Trump, Remarks on the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement and an Exchange with Reporters
Prior to Departure for Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 660, at 1 (Oct. 2).
65
White House Press Release, Joint Statement on the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement (Sept. 24,
2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/joint-statement-united-states-korea-free-trade-agreement [https://perma.cc/K4FB-RRPG]; see also Galbraith, supra note 10, at 510–12 (discussing the preliminary
renegotiation reached in the spring of 2018).
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United States, after almost two years of declining to do so.66 On October 16, Trump sent
notiﬁcation letters to Congress that he would enter new negotiations with the EU, Japan, and
the UK—a process that he began with Canada and Mexico approximately one year before
completing the NAFTA renegotiations that resulted in the USMCA.67 As for China, following a major wave of tariffs and counter-tariffs, the status of negotiations remained far from
clear as 2018 drew towards its close.68 In early December, the two countries agreed not to
impose further new tariffs during a ninety-day window in which further negotiations would
be conducted.69

INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW
Congress Signals Concern Over U.S. Role in Aiding Saudi Arabia’s Activities in Yemen
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.114
As the conﬂict in Yemen continues, congressional concern over U.S. support for the Saudiled coalition ﬁghting in the region has grown.1 The objects of these concerns include thousands of civilian casualties, a cholera epidemic, and a country on the brink of famine.2 In
October 2018, relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia became further complicated by the brutal death of Jamal Khashoggi, a prominent journalist and outspoken critic of
the Saudi government.3
Since 2011, the United States has carried out counterterrorism operations in Yemen aimed
at Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and later also at the Islamic State of Iraq and the
Levant (ISIL).4 As grounds under domestic law for these military actions, the United States
66
Motoko Rich, Japan’s Embrace of Bilateral Trade Talks with U.S. Spares It from Tariffs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27,
2018), at https://nyti.ms/2NIAYay (noting Japan’s concern that the United States might impose tariffs on
imported cars).
67
White House Press Release, Remarks by President Trump in a Cabinet Meeting (Oct. 17, 2018), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/remarks-president-trump-cabinet-meeting-11 [https://perma.cc/
Z768-QVCM].
68
Glenn Thrush, Trump Trade Adviser Warns That There Will Be No Quick Deal with China, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
9, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/09/us/politics/peter-navarro-china-trade.html; see also Galbraith,
supra note 12, at 751–53 (describing the wide-ranging tariffs and counter-tariffs imposed by China and the United
States in the summer and fall of 2018 and the related WTO requests for consultations).
69
Keith Bradsher & Alan Rappeport, U.S.-China Trade Truce Gives Both Sides Political Breathing Room, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 2, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/02/business/trade-truce-china-us.html.
1
See CHRISTOPHER M. BLANCHARD & JEREMY M. SHARP, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45046, THE WAR IN YEMEN:
A COMPILATION OF LEGISLATION IN THE 115TH CONGRESS 5–7 (2018), available at https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/
R45046.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BFH-Y2QD].
2
See generally Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, Including Violations and Abuses Since September 2014,
Rep. of the H.R.C., UN Doc. A/HRC/39/43 (2018) [hereinafter Situation of Human Rights in Yemen].
3
See Mark Landler & Edward Wong, Trump Says Saudi Account of Khashoggi Killing Is “Worst Cover-Up” in
History, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/khashoggi-cover-uptrump.html (discussing how the killing of Khashoggi is causing tension between Saudi Arabia and the United
States, including with respect to arms sales).
4
Oona Hathaway, Alexandra Francis, Aaron Haviland, Srinath Reddy Kethireddy & Alyssa Yamamoto, The
Yemen Crisis and the Law: The Saudi-Led Campaign and U.S. Involvement, JUST SECURITY (Feb. 20, 2018), at
https://www.justsecurity.org/52718/js-yemen-crisis-forum-saudi-campaign-us-involvement.
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continues to rely upon Congress’s 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force against
groups responsible for the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001.5 At the international level,
the internationally recognized government of Yemen has consented to these operations.6
In December 2017, U.S. Central Command acknowledged that “U.S. forces have conducted
multiple ground operations and more than 120 strikes in 2017” against AQAP and ISIL in
Yemen.7 As of November 6, 2018, it reported thirty-six air strikes for the year to date.8
Separate from its own military operations, the United States has supported the Saudiled campaign against the Houthi movement in Yemen.9 In March 2015, President Obama
“authorized the provision of logistical and intelligence support” and established a planning
mechanism “with Saudi Arabia to coordinate U.S. military and intelligence support.”10
This assistance included refueling for warplanes and targeting information, but not direct
military involvement in the conﬂict.11 The following year, the Obama administration
began to review and scale back U.S. assistance to the coalition due to concern over the
high rate of civilian casualties.12 It also began emphasizing the need for a political settlement to the conﬂict.13 By December 2016, the Obama administration had decreased the
number of personnel working with the coalition in Riyadh and deferred the planned sale of

5
Id.; see also Letter from Charles Faulkner, U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Legis. Aff. to Senator Bob Corker,
Chairman, Senate Committee on Foreign Rel. (Aug. 2, 2017), available at https://www.politico.com/f/?
id=0000015d-a3bf-d43a-a3dd-b3bf14170000 [https://perma.cc/UB3A-ZSCH].
6
Kristina Daugirdas & Julian Davis Mortenson, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 111 AJIL 523,
526 & n. 30 (2017) (discussing the “complicated” nature of this consent in light of the fact that Yemen’s internationally recognized government is effectively in exile); see also REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS
GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL SECURITY OPERATIONS 6 (Mar.
2018), available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4411804/3-18-War-Powers-TransparencyReport.pdf (stating that “[a]s a matter of international law, we note that the airstrikes against ISI[L] have been
conducted with the consent of the Government of Yemen in the context of its armed conﬂict against ISI[L]
and also in furtherance of U.S. national self-defense”); Cf. David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Yemen Withdraws
Permission for U.S. Antiterror Ground Missions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 7, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/
02/07/world/middleeast/yemen-special-operations-missions.html (reporting that, following a raid that led to
the death of Yemeni children and a U.S. servicemember, Yemen withdrew its permission for the United States
to conduct ground attacks but left in place its acceptance of U.S. drone strikes).
7
U.S. Cent. Comm. Press Release, Update on Recent Counterterrorism Strikes in Yemen (Dec. 20, 2017), at
http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/1401383/update-on-recentcounterterrorism-strikes-in-yemen [https://perma.cc/2JQW-9ALE].
8
U.S. Cent. Comm. Press Release, CENTCOM Updates Counterterrorism Strikes in Yemen (Nov. 6, 2018), at
http://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/1683907/centcom-updatescounterterrorism-strikes-in-yemen [https://perma.cc/BL4A-5PEQ].
9
See Hathaway, Francis, Haviland, Kethireddy & Yamamoto, supra note 4 (elaborating on these issues and also
noting that the Houthis are deemed to be supported by Iran).
10
White House Press Release, Statement by NSC Spokesperson Bernadette Meehan on the Situation in Yemen
(Mar. 25, 2015), at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2015/03/25/statement-nsc-spokesperson-bernadette-meehan-situation-yemen; cf. Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 6, at 531–33 (discussing circumstances under which U.S. aid to the Saudi military campaign might violate international law); Oona
Hathaway, Alexandra Francis, Aaron Haviland, Srinath Reddy Kethireddy & Alyssa Yamamoto, Yemen: Is the
U.S. Breaking the Law?, __ HARV. NAT’L SEC. L.J. __ (forthcoming 2019), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3272263 (analyzing the legality of U.S. involvement in Yemen under both international and domestic law).
11
Daugirdas & Mortenson, supra note 6, at 523.
12
Id. at 529.
13
Id.
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about $350 million dollars’ worth of precision guided munitions.14 Refueling assistance
remained in effect, however, and some arms sales continued.15
After taking ofﬁce, President Trump continued and enhanced the Obama administration’s
facilitation of the Saudi-led campaign. During his trip to Riyadh in May 2017, he approvingly
described the “strong action against Houthi militants in Yemen” as a “signiﬁcant contribution[]
to regional security” on the part of Saudi Arabia and its coalition.16 He announced an arms
deal with the kingdom worth $110 billion, saying it would “help the Saudi military to take a
greater role in security operations.”17 This deal included the sale of precision-guided
munitions.18
In June 2017, the Senate rejected a proposal to block the sale of $500 million in precisionguided munitions, by a vote of 53–47.19 Senators Rand Paul, Chris Murphy, and Al Franken,
the resolution’s sponsors, sought to prohibit the transaction because they believe the coalition
to be using these weapons to target civilians.20 After the vote, Senator Murphy tweeted: “My
resolution halting $500m of Saudi arms sale failed 47–53. But twenty more votes than similar
resolution last fall. Strong message to Saudis.”21 This narrowing margin signaled growing
concern over the Saudi-led coalition’s actions in Yemen and the rising number of civilian
casualties. The Trump administration, however, stated that providing the coalition with
such munitions was necessary to help it avoid hitting civilians and noted that the sale
would be accompanied by training aimed at reducing civilian casualties.22
In August 2018, Congress took action with the passage of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019 (NDAA).23 The act contains multiple provisions
that bear on the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and on civilian casualties more generally.
Most notably, the Senate Armed Services committee incorporated an earlier proposed joint

14

Id. at 529–30.
Id.
16
Donald J. Trump, Remarks at the Arab Islamic American Summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 2017 DAILY
COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 350 at 4 (May 21).
17
Id. at 2. For other aspects of the Trump administration’s support for the Saudi-led coalition, see BLANCHARD
& SHARP, supra note 1, at 2–4.
18
Mark Landler, Eric Schmitt & Matt Apuzzo, $110 Billion Weapons Sale to Saudis Has Jared Kushner’s Personal
Touch, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2017), at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/18/world/middleeast/jared-kushnersaudi-arabia-arms-deal-lockheed.html?module=inline.
19
S. Res. 42, 115th Cong. (2017); 163 CONG. REC. S100, 3427–28 (daily ed. June 13, 2017); see also Anne
Gearan, Symbolic Effort to Block Part of Saudi Arms Sale Falls Short in the Senate, WASH. POST (June 13, 2017), at
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/symbolic-effort-to-block-part-of-saudi-arms-salefalls-short-in-the-senate/2017/06/13/d68944f8-506a-11e7-b064-828ba60fbb98_story.html?utm_term=.
22fe01b8f3b0.
20
Gearan, supra note 19.
21
Chris Murphy (@ChrisMurphyCT), TWITTER (June 13, 2017, 12:09 PM), at https://twitter.com/
ChrisMurphyCT/status/874705391371911168.
22
Eric Schmitt, Saudi Arabia Tries to Ease Concerns Over Civilian Deaths in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2017),
at https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/14/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-arms-training-yemen.html. A year
later, the Trump administration submitted the sale of more than 120,000 precision-guided munitions to the coalition for congressional review, again arguing that precision-guided munitions reduce the risk of civilian casualties.
Patricia Zengerle, Pompeo Says Precision-Guided Missiles, as in Yemen, Cut Risks to Civilians, REUTERS (May 23,
2018), at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pompeo-arms-saudi/pompeo-says-precision-guided-missilesas-in-yemen-cut-risks-to-civilians-idUSKCN1IO2LD.
23
John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, Pub. L. No. 115-232 (2018).
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resolution into the NDAA, which passed with little modiﬁcation as Section 1290 of the act.24
Senator Todd Young commented: “The legislation—which would represent one of the more
substantive actions by Congress in years related to Yemen—seeks to end the civil war in
Yemen, protect civilians, and address the world’s largest humanitarian disaster where approximately eight million people are at risk of famine.”25
Section 1290 prohibits appropriations for in-ﬂight refueling of coalition aircrafts if the secretary of state cannot certify that the governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab
Emirates are undertaking:
(A) an urgent and good faith effort to support diplomatic efforts to end the civil war in
Yemen;
(B) appropriate measures to alleviate the humanitarian crisis in Yemen by increasing
access for Yemenis to food, fuel, medicine, and medical evacuation, including
through the appropriate use of Yemen’s Red Sea ports, including the port of
Hudaydah, the airport in Sana’a, and external border crossings with Saudi Arabia;
and
(C) demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure
resulting from military operations of the Government of Saudi Arabia and the
Government of the United Arab Emirates in Yemen, including by —
(i) complying with applicable agreements and laws regulating defense articles
purchased or transferred from the United States; and
(ii) taking appropriate steps to avoid disproportionate harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure . . . .26
The provision allows the secretary of state to waive these restrictions if he or she speciﬁes
that doing so is in the national security interest of the United States, explains why the certiﬁcation cannot be made, and describes the actions the administration is taking to bring the
governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates into compliance.27 The provision
also includes a detailed reporting obligation that requires the administration to provide
Congress with brieﬁngs about the situation in Yemen and a strategy to accomplish the objectives of the provision.28
In Trump’s signing statement for the NDAA, he observed that Section 1290 “purport[s]”
to require the president to notify Congress before taking certain military or diplomatic
24

BLANCHARD & SHARP, supra note 1, at 5; see also Letter from Senators Todd Young, Jeanne Shaheen, Susan
M. Collins, Christopher S. Murphy, Benjamin L. Cardin, Jack Reed, Christopher A. Coons, Tim Kaine & Cory
A. Booker to Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, U.S. Dep’t of State & James Mattis, Secretary of Defense,
U.S. Dep’t of Defense (Aug. 29, 2018), available at https://www.young.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2018.08.
29%20Letter%20to%20SecState%20Pompeo_YoungShaheen_Yemen%20Statute.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TMPV82F] (stating that this provision “enjoys . . . broad, bipartisan, and bicameral support”).
25
U.S. Senate, Senator Todd Young Press Release, Young, Shaheen Successfully Include Yemen Provision in
NDAA Conference Report (July 24, 2018), at https://www.young.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/youngshaheen-successfully-include-yemen-provision-in-ndaa-conference-report [https://perma.cc/PQF7-PC3L].
26
Pub. L. No. 115-232 § 1290(c)(1) (2018). The potential restrictions, however, do not apply to appropriations for in-ﬂight refueling of coalition aircrafts used in certain operations, including counterterrorism missions
against AQAP and ISIL and actions to prevent “the transport, assembly, or employment of ballistic missiles or
components in Yemen.” § 1290(a)(1)(A)–(B).
27
§ 1290(a)(2).
28
§ 1290(b).
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actions.29 He deemed this provision to “encompass only actions for which such advance certiﬁcation or notiﬁcation is feasible and consistent with the President’s exclusive constitutional
authorities as Commander in Chief and as the sole representative of the Nation in foreign
affairs.”30
Two other provisions of the NDAA signal concern over civilian casualties in conjunction
with U.S. military operations in general.31 Section 936 calls for the designation of a senior
civilian ofﬁcial in the Department of Defense “to develop, coordinate, and oversee compliance with the policy of the Department relating to civilian casualties resulting from United
States military operations.”32 The statutory provision sets out speciﬁc responsibilities for this
ofﬁcial, including the development of “uniform processes and standards across combatant
commands for accurately recording kinetic strikes by the United States military” and “the
development and dissemination of best practices for reducing the likelihood of civilian casualties from United States military operations.”33 The other provision—Section 1062—
modiﬁes and expands the civilian casualty reporting requirement included in the National
Defense Authorization Act For Fiscal Year 2018.34 Among other things, it makes clear
that Congress wants reporting on “each speciﬁc mission, strike, engagement, raid, or incident” that is suspected to have caused civilian casualties and that this reporting should include
“a differentiation between those killed and those injured.”35 While Trump raised issues about
both provisions in his signing statement,36 the Department of Defense later designated an
ofﬁcial pursuant to Section 936.37
In September 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo provided an initial certiﬁcation under
Section 1290,38 thereby enabling continued U.S. in-ﬂight refueling of coalition aircrafts. He
announced: “[T]he governments of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are undertaking
29

Donald J. Trump, Statement on Signing the John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2019, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. No. 533 at 1 (Aug. 13) [hereinafter Trump Signing Statement].
30
Id.; see also Scott R. Anderson, What to Make of Trump’s NDAA Signing Statement, LAWFARE (Aug. 23, 2018),
at https://www.lawfareblog.com/what-make-trumps-ndaa-signing-statement (considering that this standard of
“‘feasible and consistent’ . . . actually implies that the Trump administration accepts the validity of the [relevant]
NDAA provisions . . . in at least some scenarios”).
31
For a longer discussion of these provisions, see Rita Siemion, Two Important New Civilian Casualties
Provisions in the Defense Authorization Bill, JUST SECURITY (July 24, 2018), at https://www.justsecurity.org/
59695/important-civilian-casualties-provisions-congressional-bill-national-defense-authorization-act.
32
Pub. L. No. 115-232 § 936(a).
33
§ 936(b) (also imposing a reporting obligation on this ofﬁcial).
34
§ 1062(a).
35
Id.
36
Trump Signing Statement, supra note 29, at 1 (stating with respect to Section 936 that “my Administration
will implement [this provision] consistent with the President’s authority as Commander in Chief”); id. at 2 (stating
with respect to Section 1062 that the information sought might be subject to “executive privilege” and further that
the administration considers this provision “as not requiring changes in underlying DOD processes for battle damage assessment and investigation”).
37
Department of Defense, Memorandum of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Designating a Senior
Civilian Ofﬁcial for Civilian Casualty Policy (Oct. 23, 2018), available at https://www.humanrightsﬁrst.org/sites/
default/ﬁles/CIVCAS_Coord%20_Memo_Final.pdf (designating the deputy under secretary of defense for policy
as this ofﬁcial).
38
See generally Certiﬁcation Under Section 1290 of the John S. McCain Nation Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2019 Related to Military Assistance for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates by Secretary of
State Mike Pompeo, available at https://www.young.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Yemen%20Certiﬁcation%
20Unclassiﬁed.pdf [https://perma.cc/VS8P-83A6].
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demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations of these governments.”39 Reporting suggests that Pompeo
rejected concerns from State Department specialists worried about the rising death toll in
the region and instead aligned himself with his legislative affairs team, which expressed concern that non-certiﬁcation could undermine arm sales.40
Pompeo’s certiﬁcation came amid heightened concern about civilian casualties caused by
the Saudi-led coalition. On August 9, the coalition bombed a bus carrying about sixty students, ages eight to fourteen, to a mosque for an end of summer celebration, killing more than
forty of these children.41 Saudi Arabia initially characterized the action as a “legitimate military action”42 but later issued a rare apology, concluding “that there were mistakes made in
abiding by the rules of engagement.”43 Later in August, the UN Ofﬁce of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights issued a report based on an earlier and extensive fact-ﬁnding mission which sharply criticized the coalition. It identiﬁed 6,475 civilian deaths from
attacks in Yemen between March 2015 and June 2018, with most of these attacks carried
out by coalition air strikes.44 Among the conclusions of the independent experts who generated the report were that individuals in the coalition “may have conducted attacks in violation
of the principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution that may amount to war
crimes.”45 The report also noted that since “April 2017, a cholera epidemic has swept through
Yemen at an unprecedented scale” and that, as of May 2018, 8.4 million people “were on the
brink of famine.”46
39

U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Certiﬁcation to Congress on Actions of Saudi Arabia and UAE in Yemen
Under the NDAA (Sept. 12, 2018), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/09/285861.htm [https://
perma.cc/X3Y7-U77Z]. Defense Secretary Mattis endorsed Pompeo’s certiﬁcation stating, “[T]he governments
of Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates are making every effort to reduce the risk of civilian casualties and collateral damage to civilian infrastructure resulting from their military operations to end the civil war in Yemen.”
U.S. Dep’t of Defense Press Release, Statement by Secretary of Defense James N. Mattis on Actions of Saudi
Arabia and UAE in Yemen (Sept. 12, 2018), at https://dod.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/News-ReleaseView/Article/1628689/statement-by-secretary-of-defense-james-n-mattis-on-actions-of-saudi-arabia-and [https://
perma.cc/C3GT-A23Z].
40
Dion Nissenbaum, Top U.S. Diplomat Backed Continuing Support for Saudi War in Yemen Over Objections of
Staff, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 20, 2018), at https://www.wsj.com/articles/top-u-s-diplomat-backed-continuing-support-for-saudi-war-in-yemen-over-objections-of-staff-1537441200.
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Ali Al-Mujahed & Sudarsan Raghavan, Airstrike by U.S.-Backed Saudi coalition on Bus Kills Dozens of Yemeni
Children, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/airstrike-by-usally-on-bus-carrying-yemeni-children-kills-and-wounds-scores/2018/08/09/c047e55e-bbc6-42ff-a5db4bd2e629f0b6_story.html?utm_term=.182f4c078f35.
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Id.
43
The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Press Release, Statement from the Coalition to Restore
Legitimacy in Yemen on August 9th JIAT Investigation Findings (Sept. 4, 2018) at https://www.saudiembassy.net/news/statement-coalition-restore-legitimacy-yemen-august-9th-jiat-investigation-ﬁndings [https://
perma.cc/2DWJ-PGHH].
44
Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, supra note 2, at 5 (noting that “the real ﬁgure is likely to be signiﬁcantly higher”); see also Yemen: United Nations Experts Point to Possible War Crimes by Parties to the Conﬂict
(Aug. 28, 2018), at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=23479 [https://
perma.cc/UWC4-8BJB].
45
Situation of Human Rights in Yemen, supra note 2, at 14 (also ﬁnding that that coalition members “have
committed acts that may amount to war crimes, including cruel treatment and torture, outrages upon personal
dignity, rape and conscripting or enlisting children under the age of 15 or using them to participate actively in
hostilities”).
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Id. at 30–31. This number increased dramatically in subsequent months. See Humanitarian Aid, Half the
Population of Yemen at Risk of Famine: UN Emergency Relief Chief, UN NEWS (Oct. 23, 2018), at https://news.un.
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Within a month of Pompeo’s decision to issue the Section 1290 certiﬁcation, a bipartisan
group of senators wrote a letter stating that “we ﬁnd it difﬁcult to reconcile known facts” with
Pompeo’s decision.47 The letter continued:
[Y]ou certiﬁed that the Governments of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates
(UAE) are undertaking “demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to civilians
and civilian infrastructure resulting from military operations” in Yemen.
Several facts on the ground in Yemen, however, cast serious doubt on this certiﬁcation.
There has been a dramatic increase in civilian casualties and deaths from Saudi-led coalition airstrikes over the last few months. The death of dozens of children in successive
Saudi airstrikes in August tragically and deﬁnitively underscored this trend and the failure
of the Saudi-led coalition to undertake demonstrable actions to reduce the risk of harm to
civilians.
...
In short, we are skeptical a certiﬁcation that the two Governments have undertaken
demonstrable actions to reduce the harm to civilians is warranted when the Saudi coalition has failed to adopt some U.S. recommendations while civilian deaths and casualties
due to coalition airstrikes have increased dramatically in recent months.48
In addition to concern about the Section 1290 certiﬁcation, individual members of
Congress have expressed more general alarm over U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition.
Senator Murphy accused the Trump administration of “turning a blind eye to likely war
crimes.”49 In a letter to the Department of Defense’s inspector general, Representative
Ted Lieu stated: “I am deeply concerned that continued U.S. refueling, operational support
functions and weapons transfers could qualify as aiding and abetting these potential war
crimes.”50 Members of Congress have also introduced legislation to end U.S. support for
the coalition.51

org/en/story/2018/10/1023962 [https://perma.cc/LMN8-FK8M] (estimating that as of October 2018, 14 million people were at risk of famine).
47
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Christopher S. Murphy & Jeffrey A. Merkley to Mike Pompeo, Secretary of State, U.S. Dep’t of State (Oct. 10,
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(Aug. 13, 2018), available at https://lieu.house.gov/sites/lieu.house.gov/ﬁles/2018-08-13%20TWL%20Letter
%20to%20DoD%20IG%20Fine%20-%20Yemen.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4T7-CK2X].
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U.S.-Saudi relations have become further complicated by the brutal death of Jamal
Khashoggi. Once a top journalist in Saudi Arabia, he had moved to Washington D.C. in
2017,52 where he published columns in the Washington Post criticizing Saudi policy and
Mohammed bin Salman, the Saudi crown prince.53 On the afternoon of October 2, 2018,
Khashoggi entered the Saudi consulate in Istanbul to obtain paperwork that he needed to
marry his ﬁancée.54 Instead, he was met by a team of operatives that had ﬂown in from
Saudi Arabia that morning to wait for him at the embassy. He was killed. According to reporting sourced to a Turkish ofﬁcial, Khashoggi “was dead within minutes, beheaded, dismembered, his ﬁngers severed, and within two hours the killers were gone.”55 Around the time of
his death, a Saudi forensic expert ﬂew in from Riyadh, arrived at the consulate, remained there
for hours, and then returned again to Riyadh that evening.56 The forensic expert was apparently brought in to dismember Khashoggi’s body for concealment.57
Faced with international outrage over the weeks that followed, Saudi Arabia cycled through
conﬂicting narratives, including that Khashoggi had left the embassy without harm; that he
had accidentally died in a ﬁstﬁght in the embassy; that he was strangled by a team that had
been sent to kidnap rather than kill him; and that he was killed by a lethal tranquilizer on the
order of one intelligence agent at the embassy.58 Although an afﬁliate of Mohammed bin
Salman was present at Khashoggi’s killing, the Saudi government has claimed that the
crown prince did not authorize the murder or know about it in advance.59
On October 23, Pompeo announced that “[w]e have identiﬁed at least some of the individuals responsible, including those in the intelligence services, the Royal Court, the foreign
ministry, and other Saudi ministries who we suspect to have been involved in Mr.
Khashoggi’s death” and that “[w]e are taking appropriate actions, which include revoking
52
Carlotta Gall, What Happened to Jamal Khashoggi? Conﬂicting Reports Deepen a Mystery, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3,
2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/03/world/middleeast/khashoggi-saudi-journalist-istanbul.html.
53
E.g., Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Must Restore Dignity to His Country — by Ending Yemen’s
Cruel War, WASH. POST (Sept. 11, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/global-opinions/wp/2018/
09/11/saudi-arabias-crown-prince-must-restore-dignity-to-his-country-by-ending-yemens-cruel-war/?utm_term=.94e4d30f26a7; Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Already Controlled the Nation’s Media. Now
He’s Squeezing It Even Further, WASH. POST (Feb. 7, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/globalopinions/wp/2018/02/07/saudi-arabias-crown-prince-already-controlled-the-nations-media-now-hes-squeezingit-even-further/?utm_term=.d3b5193abef1.
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Gall, supra note 52.
55
David D. Kirkpatrick & Carlotta Gall, Audio Offers Gruesome Details of Jamal Khashoggi Killing, Turkish
Ofﬁcial Says, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/17/world/europe/turkeysaudi-khashoggi-dismember.html (further noting that Turkey apparently possessed audio tapes of what transpired
within the Saudi consulate).
56
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Journalist Jamal Khashoggi, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/saudi-forensic-expert-is-among-15-named-by-turkey-in-disappearance-of-journalist-jamal-khashoggi/2018/10/11/
e62d6dd4-cd6a-11e8-ad0a-0e01efba3cc1_story.html?utm_term=.d66ebe4e14b2 (noting that the forensic
expert’s ﬂight left Riyadh “just nine minutes after Khashoggi entered the country’s diplomatic compound in
Turkey” and that he returned to Riyadh on an 11p.m. ﬂight).
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See id.
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Ben Hubbard & David D. Kirkpatrick, Saudis Shift Account of Khashoggi Killing Again, as 5 Agents Face Death
Penalty, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/15/world/middleeast/saudi-arabiakhashoggi-death-penalty.html.
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Id. (noting that the agent, Maher Abdulaziz Mutreb, was an “intelligence agent who has often traveled abroad
as part of the crown prince’s security detail”).
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visas, entering visa lookouts, and other measures.”60 He added that “[w]e continue to maintain a strong partnership with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.”61 On November 15, the State
Department further announced sanctions pursuant to the Global Magnitsky Human Rights
Accountability Act on seventeen Saudi government ofﬁcials that it deemed implicated in
Khashoggi’s killing.62 That same day, the Saudi public prosecutor announced the ﬁling of
criminal charges against eleven alleged perpetrators and expressed the intention of seeking
the death penalty against ﬁve of them.63
The Saudi ofﬁcials sanctioned by the State Department did not include Mohammed bin
Salman, although news reporting has suggested that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
has concluded with “high conﬁdence” that the crown prince ordered Khashoggi’s murder.64
On November 20, Trump issued a statement indicating reluctance to hold the crown prince
accountable.65 The statement included the following:
The world is a very dangerous place!
...
. . . Saudi Arabia would gladly withdraw from Yemen if the Iranians would agree to leave.
They would immediately provide desperately needed humanitarian assistance. . . .
After my heavily negotiated trip to Saudi Arabia last year, the Kingdom agreed to spend
and invest $450 billion in the United States. . . . Of the $450 billion, $110 billion will be
spent on the purchase of military equipment from Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon
and many other great U.S. defense contractors. If we foolishly cancel these contracts,
Russia and China would be the enormous beneﬁciaries—and very happy to acquire all
of this newfound business. . . .
The crime against Jamal Khashoggi was a terrible one, and one that our country does not
condone. Indeed, we have taken strong action against those already known to have participated in the murder. . . .
. . . King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman vigorously deny any knowledge of the planning or execution of the murder of Mr. Khashoggi. Our intelligence
agencies continue to assess all information, but it could very well be that the Crown
Prince had knowledge of this tragic event—maybe he did and maybe he didn’t!
60
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Remarks to Press by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (Oct. 23, 2018), at
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WZW2-Y3XM] (noting that “all of these individuals’ assets within U.S. jurisdiction are blocked, and U.S. persons
are generally prohibited from engaging in transactions with them”).
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That being said, we may never know all of the facts surrounding the murder of Mr. Jamal
Khashoggi. In any case, our relationship is with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. They have
been a great ally in our very important ﬁght against Iran. The United States intends to
remain a steadfast partner of Saudi Arabia to ensure the interests of our country, Israel,
and all our other partners in the region.66
Trump’s statement triggered outrage from members of Congress of both parties. Senator
Chuck Schumer tweeted that this is “not how a U.S. President responds to the murder of a
journalist and American resident.”67 As another even more pointed example, Senator Bob
Corker tweeted that “I never thought I’d see the day a White House would moonlight as a
public relations ﬁrm for the Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia.”68
Khashoggi’s death has also drawn additional attention to U.S. involvement in the Saudi
coalition’s campaign in Yemen. Not long after the killing, Senator Paul promised to force
a ﬂoor vote over future arms sales to Saudi Arabia,69 and several other senators introduced
a bill that would impose sanctions and other measures on those responsible for the crisis in
Yemen and for the death of Khashoggi.70 In a notable signal, the Senate also voted 63–37 to
advance a resolution aimed at ending U.S. military support for the Saudi-led coalition.71 “The
Senate then approved this resolution, 56–41, and also unanimously approved a resolution
expressing its view that Mohammed bin Salman was involved in Khashoggi’s death.”72 In
the executive branch as well, several policy developments occurred in the months that followed Khashoggi’s death. Pressure mounted to stop refueling of the Saudi-led coalition, leading Saudi Arabia to preemptively announce that it would no longer seek U.S. assistance with
refueling.73 In another development, Pompeo urged a ceaseﬁre, saying that “[t]he United
66

Id.
Chuck Schumer (@SenSchumer), TWITTER (Nov. 20, 2018, 12:22pm), at https://twitter.com/senschumer/
status/1064977318865788928?lang=en.
68
Bob Corker (@SenBobCorker), TWITTER (Nov. 20, 2018, 2:18pm), at https://twitter.com/senbobcorker/status/1065006401272143873?lang=en. For some other responses, see Adam Edelman & F. Brinley Bruton, In
Unusual Statement Disputing the CIA and Filled with Exclamation Points, Trump Backs Saudi Ruler After
Khashoggi Killing, NBC NEWS (Nov. 20, 2018), at https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/unusualstatement-disputing-cia-ﬁlled-exclamation-points-trump-backs-saudi-n938526.
69
Jordain Carney, Rand Paul Vows to Force Vote on Saudi Arms Sales Over Missing Journalist, THE HILL (Oct. 9,
2018), at https://thehill.com/homenews/senate/410585-rand-paul-vows-to-force-vote-on-saudi-arms-sales-overmissing-journalist.
70
U.S. Senate, Senator Bob Menendez Press Release, Menendez, Young, Reed, Graham, Shaheen, Collins
Introduce Comprehensive Saudi Arabia Accountability and Yemen Act (Nov. 15, 2018), at https://www.menendez.senate.gov/news-and-events/press/menendez-young-reed-graham-shaheen-collins-introduce-comprehensivesaudi-arabia-accountability-and-yemen-act [https://perma.cc/R382-HWD8].
71
Karoun Demirjian, Carol Morello & John Hudson, Rebuking Trump, Senators Back Effort to Suspend U.S.
Support for the Saudi-led War in Yemen, WASH. POST (Nov. 28, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/
powerpost/pompeo-mattis-to-brief-senate-on-saudi-arabia-khashoggi-and-yemen/2018/11/27/ee4e36c0-f28a11e8-bc79-68604ed88993_story.html?utm_term=.5a90efbfd910. This resolution was brought forward through
a procedural mechanism set out under the War Powers Resolution. See id.
72
“Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Eric Schmitt, Senate Votes to End Aid for Yemen Fight Over Khashoggi Killing and
Saudis’ War Aims, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/politics/yemensaudi-war-pompeo-mattis.html. In the absence of similar action by the House of Representatives, the effect of
these resolutions is symbolic. See id.”
73
Wesley Morgan, Pentagon: No More Refueling of Saudi Aircraft Bombing Yemen, POLITICO (Nov. 9, 2018).
67
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States calls on all parties to support UN Special Envoy Martin Grifﬁths in ﬁnding a peaceful
solution to the conﬂict in Yemen . . . . The time is now for the cessation of hostilities.”74

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
Trump Administration Expresses Strong Disapproval of the International Criminal Court
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.110

On September 10, 2018, U.S. National Security Advisor John Bolton delivered an address
ﬁercely criticizing the International Criminal Court (ICC).1 Bolton challenged the legitimacy
of the ICC and expressed particular concern over its inquiry into potential war crimes committed by members of the U.S. military and intelligence agencies in Afghanistan. He identiﬁed retaliatory measures the United States would undertake if the ICC “comes after us, Israel
or other U.S. allies.”2
In his address, Bolton harkened back to certain actions taken by the United States during
the George W. Bush administration in opposition to the ICC, including actions in which
Bolton himself was involved as a member of that administration. He mentioned President
Bush’s decision to “‘unsign’” the Rome Statute; Congress’s passage of “The American
Servicemembers’ Protection Act, or ASPA, which some have branded ‘The Hague
Invasion Act’”; and the Bush administration’s negotiation of “about 100 binding, bilateral
agreements to prevent other countries from delivering U.S. personnel to the ICC.”3
Bolton made no mention of the approach taken by the Obama administration to the ICC,
which had been to “‘end hostility towards the ICC, and look for opportunities to encourage
effective ICC action in ways that promote U.S. interests by bringing war criminals to
justice.’”4
Bolton stated that the “worst predictions” from the George W. Bush era “were conﬁrmed”
by the ICC prosecutor’s request in November 2017 to initiate an investigation into war
crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan and neighboring countries.5
74

U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Ending the Conﬂict in Yemen (Oct. 30, 2018), at https://www.state.gov/
secretary/remarks/2018/10/287018.htm [https://perma.cc/CSA4-GBW6].
1
John Bolton, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, National Security Advisor, Protecting
American Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from International Threats (Sept. 10, 2018), available at https://
www.justsecurity.org/60674/national-security-adviser-john-bolton-remarks-international-criminal-court; see
also White House Fact Sheet, Protecting American Constitutionalism and Sovereignty from the International
Criminal Court (Sept. 10, 2018), at https://www.whitehouse.gov/brieﬁngs-statements/protecting-americanconstitutionalism-sovereignty-international-criminal-court [https://perma.cc/7TBT-JK8A].
2
Bolton, supra note 1.
3
Id. Among other provisions, ASPA authorizes the president to use all “means necessary and appropriate” to free
U.S. military personnel or other U.S. government employees detained or imprisoned “by, on behalf of, or at the
request of the International Criminal Court.” Pub. L. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820, 905 (2002) (codiﬁed at 22 U.S.C. §
7427 (2012)).
4
Harold Hongju Koh, International Criminal Justice 5.0, 38 YALE J. INT’L L. 525, 534 (2013) (quoting
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and going on to describe the Obama administration’s approach to the ICC).
5
Bolton, supra note 1; see also International Criminal Court Statement, The Prosecutor of the International
Criminal Court, Fatou Bensouda, Requests Judicial Authorisation to Commence an Investigation into the
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For more than a decade before this request, the prosecutor had conducted a preliminary
examination into the situation of Afghanistan.6 In seeking permission from the ICC bench
to move forward and open an investigation, the prosecutor speciﬁcally identiﬁed war crimes
committed by U.S. military and intelligence personnel as one set of crimes that she “has determined that there is a reasonable basis to believe . . . have occurred.”7
Bolton expressed outrage at what he termed “an utterly unfounded, unjustiﬁable investigation.”8 He stated:
Today, on the eve of September 11th, I want to deliver a clear and unambiguous message
on behalf of the President of the United States. The United States will use any means
necessary to protect our citizens and those of our allies from unjust prosecution by
this illegitimate court.
We will not cooperate with the ICC. We will provide no assistance to the ICC. We will
not join the ICC.
We will let the ICC die on its own. After all, for all intents and purposes, the ICC is
already dead to us.
The United States bases this policy on ﬁve principal concerns about the Court, its purported authority, and its effectiveness.
First, the International Criminal Court unacceptably threatens American sovereignty
and U.S. national security interests. The Prosecutor in The Hague claims essentially
unfettered discretion to investigate, charge, and prosecute individuals, regardless of
whether their countries have acceded to the Rome Statute.
...
Second, the International Criminal Court claims jurisdiction over crimes that have disputed and ambiguous deﬁnitions, exacerbating the Court’s unfettered powers.
...
Third, the International Criminal Court fails in its fundamental objective to deter and
punish atrocity crimes. Since its 2002 inception, the Court has spent over $1.5 billion
dollars, while attaining only eight convictions.
...
Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (Nov. 20, 2017), at https://www.icc-cpi.int//Pages/item.aspx?
name=171120-otp-stat-afgh [https://perma.cc/C2V3-XDC3] [hereinafter Description of Prosecutor’s Request].
6
Description of Prosecutor’s Request, supra note 5. The Rome Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over crimes
committed on the territory of a state party, which Afghanistan has been since 2003, “regardless of whether the
alleged suspects are nationals of a State Party.” Situation in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, ICC-02/17,
Public Redacted Version of Request for Authorisation of an Investigation Pursuant to Article 15, para. 44
(Nov. 20, 2017), available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_06891.PDF.
7
Description of Prosecutor’s Request, supra note 5 (referencing “[w]ar crimes by members of the United States
. . . armed forces on the territory of Afghanistan, and by members of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency . . . in
secret detention facilities in Afghanistan and on the territory of other State Parties to the Rome Statute, principally
in the period of 2003–2004”).
8
Bolton, supra note 1.
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Fourth, the International Criminal Court is superﬂuous, given that domestic U.S. judicial systems already hold American citizens to the highest legal and ethical standards. U.S.
service members in the ﬁeld must operate fully in accordance with the law of armed conﬂict. When violations of law do occur, the United States takes appropriate and swift
action to hold perpetrators accountable.
...
Fifth, the International Criminal Court’s authority has been sharply criticized and
rejected by most of the world. Today, more than 70 nations, representing two-thirds
of the world’s population, and over 70% of the world’s armed forces, are not members
of the ICC.9
At the close of his remarks, Bolton identiﬁed potential responses by the United States to the
ICC:
If the Court comes after us, Israel or other U.S. allies, we will not sit quietly. We will take
the following steps, among others, in accordance with the American Servicemembers’
Protection Act and our other legal authorities:
- We will negotiate even more binding, bilateral agreements to prohibit nations from
surrendering U.S. persons to the ICC. And we will ensure that those we have already
entered are honored by our counterpart governments.
- We will respond against the ICC and its personnel to the extent permitted by U.S.
law. We will ban its judges and prosecutors from entering the United States. We will
sanction their funds in the U.S. ﬁnancial system, and, we will prosecute them in the
U.S. criminal system. We will do the same for any company or state that assists an
ICC investigation of Americans.
- We will take note if any countries cooperate with ICC investigations of the United
States and its allies, and we will remember that cooperation when setting U.S. foreign assistance, military assistance, and intelligence sharing levels.
- We will consider taking steps in the UN Security Council to constrain the Court’s
sweeping powers, including ensuring that the ICC does not exercise jurisdiction
over Americans and the nationals of our allies that have not ratiﬁed the Rome
Statute.10
In response to Bolton’s statements, the ICC issued a brief press release:
The International Criminal Court . . . is aware of the speech delivered on 10 September
2018 by US National Security Advisor, John Bolton, concerning the ICC.
The Court was established and constituted under the Rome Statute, the Court’s founding treaty—to which 123 countries from all regions of the world are party and have
pledged their support through ratiﬁcation—as an instrument to ensure accountability
for crimes that shock the conscience of humanity. The Court is an independent and
impartial judicial institution.
9

Id.
Id.

10
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The Court’s jurisdiction is subject to the primary jurisdiction of States themselves to
investigate and prosecute allegations of those crimes and bring justice to the affected
communities. It is only when the States concerned fail to do so at all or genuinely that
the ICC will exercise jurisdiction.
The ICC, as a court of law, will continue to do its work undeterred, in accordance with
those principles and the overarching idea of the rule of law.11
In the aftermath of Bolton’s speech, the ICC received statements of support from leaders in
the European Union and some states, while Bolton’s remarks drew the approval of ofﬁcials in
a few countries, such as Sudan.12 Bolton’s speech also drew a ﬂurry of critical responses from
legal scholars and practitioners within the United States. David Scheffer, the U.S. ambassador
for war crimes issues during the second term of President Bill Clinton, described the speech as
“isolat[ing] the United States from international criminal justice and severely undermin[ing]
our leadership in bringing perpetrators of atrocity crimes to justice elsewhere in the world.”13
John Bellinger, who was legal adviser to the State Department during the second term of
George W. Bush, deemed it “unfortunate . . . that the Trump administration did not engage
in quiet diplomacy with the Court to try to work out a resolution [with respect to
Afghanistan] instead of throwing down the gauntlet in public.”14
Commentators also indicated considerable skepticism about whether the Trump administration had the legal authority or political capital to undertake some of the retaliatory measures suggested by Bolton. Bellinger observed that he “is not aware of any federal criminal
statute that could be used to charge ICC judges or prosecutors, much less companies or foreign governments that cooperate with the court” and also expressed doubts about the Trump
11
Statement, International Criminal Court, The ICC Will Continue Its Independent and Impartial Work,
Undeterred, ICC-CPI-20180912-PR1406 (Sept. 12, 2018), at https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?
name=pr1406 [https://perma.cc/ZMR9-GBBA].
12
Alex Moorehead & Alex Whiting, Countries’ Reactions to Bolton’s Attack on the ICC, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 18,
2018), at https://www.justsecurity.org/60773/countries-reactions-boltons-attack-icc (compiling responses by
state ofﬁcials and noting, with respect to Sudan, that the ICC has long been investigating crimes committed
on its territory); see also International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals Press Release, Statement of
President Meron in Support of the ICC (Sept. 13, 2018) (noting that “[a]t a time when the Court and the
Rome system itself continue to face challenges . . . I wish to pause and salute the Judges and the leadership of
the ICC . . . [who] are helping to bring us ever closer to our fundamental aim: ending impunity for serious violations of international law”).
13
David Scheffer, Ambass. David Scheffer on John Bolton’s Announcement of “Ugly and Dangerous” Punitive
Actions Against Judges, Prosecutors of Int’l Criminal Court, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 10, 2018), at https://www.
justsecurity.org/60678/ambass-david-scheffer-john-boltons-announcement-ugly-dangerous-punitive-actionsjudges-prosecutors-intl-criminal-court; see also, e.g., Jane Stromseth, Why Bolton’s Assault on the ICC Is Not in U.S.
Interests, JUST SECURITY (Sept. 14, 2018), at https://www.justsecurity.org/60743/boltons-assault-icc-u-s-interests
(contending that these policies “undermine[] crucial efforts to strengthen legal accountability in domestic courts in
many countries emerging from conﬂict”); Jennifer Trahan, The Fallacy That Attacking a Judicial Institution and Its
Personnel Protects Americans: A Response to John Bolton’s Speech, OPINIO JURIS (Sept. 12, 2018), at http://opiniojuris.
org/2018/09/12/the-fallacy-that-attacking-a-judicial-institution-and-its-personnel-protects-americans-a-responseto-john-boltons-speech (observing that “[t]hese bullying tactics do not well-serve the [United States], and will be
seen for what they are”).
14
John Bellinger, The Trump Administration Throws Down the Gauntlet to the ICC. The Court Should Decline
the Challenge, LAWFARE (Sept. 10, 2018), at https://www.lawfareblog.com/trump-administration-throws-downgauntlet-icc-court-should-decline-challenge (also deeming the ICC Prosecutor “unwise” in seeking to open an
investigation into war crimes committed by U.S. ofﬁcials).
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administration’s ability to impose sanctions on ICC judges and prosecutors.15 As to Bolton’s
call for more bilateral agreements prohibiting countries from sending Americans to the ICC
and potentially for a Security Council resolution limiting the reach of the ICC, it is far from
clear that these measures would receive the needed support from other countries.16
Several weeks after Bolton’s speech, President Trump brieﬂy reiterated U.S. concerns
about the ICC in his address to the UN General Assembly. Trump declared that “[a]s far
as America is concerned, the ICC has no jurisdiction, no legitimacy, and no authority. . . .
We will never surrender America’s sovereignty to an unelected, unaccountable, global
bureaucracy.”17

USE OF FORCE, ARMS CONTROL, AND NONPROLIFERATION
Iran Initiates Suit Against the United States in the International Court of Justice, While Sanctions
Take Effect
doi:10.1017/ajil.2018.116

In the wake of President Trump’s decision to withdraw the United States from the Joint
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and reimpose sanctions, Iran instituted proceedings
against the United States before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). In its application,
ﬁled on July 16, 2018, Iran alleged that the re-imposition of sanctions constituted a violation
of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Treaty of Amity)
between Iran and the United States. In order to prevent “irreparable damages” to the Iranian
economy, Iran simultaneously ﬁled a request for provisional measures.1 After the ICJ issued
an order unanimously granting limited provisional measures on October 3, 2018, the United
States announced its intention to terminate the Treaty of Amity. The United States issued its
ﬁrst phase of sanctions on August 7, 2018, and the remaining sanctions took effect on
November 5, 2018.
15
Id. (noting that “[i]t would be an extraordinary stretch” to determine that, under the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act, the ICC posed a “national emergency” to justify sanctioning judges and prosecutors); see also Alex Whiting, Why John Bolton vs. Int’l Criminal Court 2.0 Is Different from Version 1.0, JUST
SECURITY (Sept. 10, 2018), at https://www.justsecurity.org/60680/international-criminal-court-john-boltonafghanistan-torture (noting that “there appears to be no domestic legal authority to take up the core of these
measures”).
16
See David Bosco, Bolton Barked at the ICC, But With How Much Bite, LAWFARE (Sept. 11, 2018), at
https://www.lawfareblog.com/bolton-barked-icc-how-much-bite (observing that countries that have not already
signed such immunity agreements are unlikely to do so under the Trump administration and that “it is exceedingly
unlikely that Britain and France (or the requisite number of non-permanent members) will support general antiICC resolutions” at the Security Council).
17
Donald J. Trump, Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly in New York City, 2018 DAILY COMP.
PRES. DOC. 631, at 4 (Sept. 25).
1
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. U.S.),
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 2018 ICJ (July 16), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/
ﬁles/case-related/175/175-20180716-REQ-01-00-EN.pdf [hereinafter 2018 Request for the Indication of
Provisional Measures].
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On May 8, 2018, Trump announced the withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA.2
Under the JCPOA—a multilateral commitment reached in July 2015 between Iran, the ﬁve permanent members of the Security Council, Germany, and the European Union—Iran agreed to
abide by veriﬁable limits on its nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of nuclear-related
sanctions.3 In announcing the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Trump issued a presidential
memorandum re-imposing “all United States sanctions lifted or waived in connection with the
JCPOA” within 180 days.4 These sanctions included both primary and secondary sanctions on
domestic and foreign entities and were to be implemented in two phases: phase one would go
into effect ninety days later on August 7 for various non-energy-related sanctions, and phase two
would go into effect 180 days later on November 5 for the remaining sanctions.5
On July 16, in response to the looming sanctions, Iran initiated suit against the United States
before the ICJ.6 Iran sought a judgment declaring that the sanctions announced by the United
States on May 8 were a breach of its international obligations under the Treaty of Amity and
ordering the immediate termination of all sanctions and associated threats.7 Additionally, Iran
sought full compensation from the United States for violating the asserted legal obligations.8
The Treaty of Amity between Iran and the United States was signed on August 15, 1955, and
entered into force on June 16, 1957.9 In its application, Iran alleged that the U.S. sanctions
violated Articles IV(1), VII(1), VIII(1), VIII(2), IX(2), and X(1), which provide in relevant part:
Article IV(1). Each High Contracting Party shall at all times accord fair and equitable
treatment to nationals and companies of the other High Contracting Party, and to
their property and enterprises; shall refrain from applying unreasonable or discriminatory
measures that would impair their legally acquired rights and interests. . . .
Article VII(1). Neither High Contracting Party shall apply restrictions on the making of
payments, remittances, and other transfers of funds to or from the territories of the other
High Contracting Party . . . .
Article VIII(1). Each High Contracting Party shall accord to products of the other High
2
Donald J. Trump, Remarks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action to Prevent Iran from Obtaining a
Nuclear Weapon and an Exchange with Reporters, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 310 (May 8).
3
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, July 14, 2015, 55 ILM 98, 108 (2016). The JCPOA was quickly followed
by the Security Council’s passage of Resolution 2231, which “[c]all[ed] upon all Member States . . . to take such
actions as may be appropriate to support the implementation of the JCPOA, including by . . . refraining from
actions that undermine implementation of commitments under the JCPOA.” SC Res. 2231, paras. 1–2 (July
20, 2015).
4
Presidential Memorandum, Ceasing U.S. Participation in the JCPOA and Taking Additional Action to
Counter Iran’s Malign Inﬂuence and Deny Iran All Paths to a Nuclear Weapon (May 8, 2018), at https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/ceasing-u-s-participation-jcpoa-taking-additional-action-counterirans-malign-inﬂuence-deny-iran-paths-nuclear-weapon [https://perma.cc/5MTH-GG9F].
5
See Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the United States, 112 AJIL 514, 518-19 (2018) (providing a
more detailed discussion of the presidential memorandum and its implications).
6
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. U.S.),
Application Instituting Proceedings, 2018 ICJ (July 16), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/
175/175-20180716-APP-01-00-EN.pdf [hereinafter 2018 Application Instituting Proceedings].
7
Id., para. 50(a)–(c).
8
Id., para. 50(e).
9
Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights, Iran-U.S., Aug. 15, 1955, 8 UST 899 [hereinafter Treaty of Amity]. The Senate advised and consented to the Treaty of Amity on July 11, 1956. 102 Cong. Rec.
12244 (1956).
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Contracting Party . . . and to products destined for exportation to the territories of such
other High Contracting Party . . . treatment no less favorable than that accorded like
products of or destined for exportation to any third country . . . .
Article VIII(2). Neither High Contracting Party shall impose restrictions or prohibitions
on the importation of any product of the other High Contracting Party or on the exportation of any product to the territories of the other High Contracting Party . . . .
Article IX(2). Nationals and companies of either High Contracting Party shall be
accorded treatment no less favorable than that accorded nationals and companies of
the other High Contracting Party, or of any third country, with respect to all matters
relating to importation and exportation.
Article X(1). Between the territories of the two High Contracting Parties there shall be
freedom of commerce and navigation.10
As a basis for the jurisdiction of the ICJ, Iran invoked Article XXI(2) of the Treaty of
Amity, which provides:
Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application
of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the
International Court of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by
some other paciﬁc means.11
The United States and Iran entered into the Treaty of Amity long before the Iranian
revolution of the late 1970s, which in turn sent relations between the United States
and Iran into a dramatic decline. Since the Iranian revolution, the Treaty of Amity has
been a basis for claims between the two nations at the ICJ on three previous occasions.
On November 29, 1979, the United States initiated proceedings against Iran regarding
the occupation of the American embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants, alleging among
other things that Iran had failed to provide U.S. nationals with “‘the most constant protection and security’” within its territory.12 On November 2, 1992, Iran in turn invoked
the Treaty of Amity against the United States in the ICJ, alleging that the destruction of
Iranian oil platforms caused by the U.S. Navy violated the treaty’s provisions protecting
freedom of commerce and navigation.13 Most recently, on June 14, 2016, Iran instituted
10
Treaty of Amity, supra note 9; see also 2018 Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 6, paras. 39–49
(setting forth the arguments of Iran with respect to these provisions).
11
Treaty of Amity, supra note 9, Art. XXI(2); see also 2018 Application Instituting Proceedings, supra note 6,
paras. 5–7 (invoking this provision and detailing Iran’s efforts to raise the issue with the United States prior to
bringing the case through a diplomatic note transmitted by Switzerland).
12
Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), Pleadings, 1979 ICJ, at 7
(Nov. 29), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/64/9545.pdf (quoting Article II(4) of the Treaty
of Amity). In its judgment of May 24, 1980, the ICJ concluded that Iran had breached its international legal obligations, including with respect to the Treaty of Amity, and was bound to release the U.S. hostages and make reparation to the United States. Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran),
Judgment, 1979 ICJ 3 (Nov. 29), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/64/064-19800524-JUD01-00-EN.pdf.
13
Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings, 1992 ICJ (Nov. 2), available at https://
www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/90/7211.pdf. The ICJ delivered a ﬁnal judgment on November 6, 2003, in
which it concluded that neither the United States nor Iran had breached its obligations under the Treaty of
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still-pending proceedings against the United States before the ICJ alleging violations of the
Treaty of Amity with respect to the seizure of Iranian assets in the United States to satisfy
U.S. domestic court judgments.14
In challenging the U.S. sanctions as a violation of the Treaty of Amity, Iran also ﬁled a
request for provisional measures during the pendency of the case. Iran asserted “a real and
imminent risk that irreparable prejudice” would follow from the implementation of U.S.
sanctions prior to the ICJ’s decision.15 Accordingly, Iran requested the ICJ to impose,
among other measures, “the suspension of the implementation and enforcement of all of
the 8 May sanctions.”16
In response to the request for provisional measures, on July 27 the United States submitted
a letter to the ICJ that “‘strongly object[ed] to Iran’s Application on a number of grounds, and
consider[ed] that the Court manifestly lack[ed] jurisdiction in respect of this case.’”17 The
United States considered that Iran’s underlying grievance related not to the Treaty of
Amity but rather to the U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, which does not have a compromissory clause providing the ICJ with jurisdiction.18 As to the Treaty of Amity, the United
States argued that the sanctions fell outside its scope because of limits set forth expressly in
Article XX(1), which provides:
Article XX(1). The present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures:
...
(b) relating to ﬁssionable materials, the radio-active by-products thereof, or the sources
thereof;
...
(d) necessary to fulﬁll the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the maintenance or
restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security
interests.19

Amity, thus rejecting Iran’s claim and the United States’ counterclaim for reparation. Oil Platforms (Iran v. U.S.),
Judgment, 1992 ICJ 161 (Nov. 2), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/90/090-20031106-JUD01-00-EN.pdf.
14
Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), Application Instituting Proceedings, 2016 ICJ (June 14), available at
https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/164/164-20160614-APP-01-00-EN.pdf (focusing on cases brought in
the United States under the exception to state immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for
state-sponsored terrorism); see also Certain Iranian Assets (Iran v. U.S.), at https://www.icj-cij.org/en/case/164
(listing the ﬁlings and proceedings in the pending case).
15
2018 Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, supra note 1, para. 25.
16
Id., para. 42(a).
17
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. U.S.),
Order, 2018 ICJ, at para. 12 (Oct. 3), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/175/175-20181003ORD-01-00-EN.pdf [hereinafter October 3 Order] (quoting the U.S. letter) (alterations in original).
18
See id.
19
Treaty of Amity, supra note 9, Art. XX(1); see also Oct. 3 Order, supra note 17, paras. 34, 37 (summarizing
the U.S. arguments); cf. U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, On U.S. Appearance Before the International Court of
Justice (Aug. 27, 2018), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/08/285411.htm [https://perma.cc/
3C8Z-TQAC] (describing Iran’s arguments as “meritless” and “a misuse of the Court”).
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Following oral proceedings in late August, the ICJ issued an order on October 3 that unanimously provided for limited provisional measures.20 The Court concluded that it had jurisdiction over at least many of Iran’s claims under the Treaty of Amity.21 It also recognized that
Article XX(1) might ultimately prove a bar to some of Iran’s claims:
However, the Court considers that, in so far as the measures complained of by Iran could
relate “to ﬁssionable materials, the radio-active by-products thereof, or the sources
thereof” or could be “necessary to protect . . . essential security interests” of the
United States, the application of Article XX paragraph 1, subparagraphs (b) or (d),
might affect at least some of the rights invoked by Iran under the Treaty of Amity.
Nonetheless, the Court is of the view that other rights asserted by Iran under the 1955
Treaty would not be so affected. In particular, Iran’s rights relating to the importation
and purchase of goods required for humanitarian needs, and to the safety of civil aviation,
cannot plausibly be considered to give rise to the invocation of Article XX, paragraph 1,
subparagraphs (b) or (d).22
The ICJ thus instructed the United States to remove impediments to imports related to
medicine, food, and certain goods and services relevant to civil aviation, but did not issue
provisional measures with respect to other sanctions.23
Hours after this ruling was released, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the
United States would terminate the Treaty of Amity.24 Pursuant to the terms of the treaty, termination can be done by either party after one year of written notice is given to the other party.25
In his remarks, Pompeo asserted that the ICJ decision largely favored the United States and
emphasized a preexisting U.S. intention to allow some humanitarian relief from sanctions:
Given Iran’s history of terrorism, ballistic missile activity, and other malign behaviors,
Iran’s claims under the treaty are absurd. The court’s ruling today was a defeat for
Iran. It rightly rejected all of Iran’s baseless requests. The court denied Iran’s attempt
to secure broad measures to interfere with U.S. sanctions and rightly noted Iran’s history
of noncompliance with its international obligations under the Treaty on the
Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
With regard to the aspects of the court’s order focusing on potential humanitarian issues,
we have been clear: Existing exceptions, authorizations, and licensing policies for
20

October 3 Order, supra note 17, para. 102. Judge Donoghue did not participate in the case. In her stead, the
United States selected Charles Brower as an ad hoc judge. Id., para. 9.
21
Id., paras. 41–44 (ﬁnding jurisdiction “at least” with respect to “the revocation of licenses and authorizations
granted for certain commercial transactions between Iran and the United States, the ban on trade of certain items,
and limitations to ﬁnancial activities”).
22
Id., paras. 68–69 (ellipsis in original).
23
Id., para. 102; see also id., para. 91 (ﬁnding that irreparable prejudice with respect to the health and safety of
Iranians would rise from the absence of the limited provisional measures granted).
24
U.S. Dep’t of State Press Release, Remarks to the Media (Oct. 3, 2018), at https://www.state.gov/secretary/
remarks/2018/10/286417.htm [https://perma.cc/29C4-5RKK] [hereinafter Pompeo Remarks of Oct. 3]. For
more discussion of the U.S. withdrawal from this treaty, see Jean Galbraith, Contemporary Practice of the
United States, 113 AJIL 133 (2019).
25
Treaty of Amity, supra note 9, Art. XXIII(2)–(3). It is unclear whether the United States has provided formal
written notice to Iran in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of Amity.
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humanitarian-related transactions and safety of ﬂight will remain in effect. The United
States has been actively engaged on these issues without regard to any proceeding before
the ICJ. We’re working closely with the Department of the Treasury to ensure that certain humanitarian-related transactions involving Iran can and will continue.
That said, we’re disappointed that the court failed to recognize it has no jurisdiction to
issue any order relating to these sanctions measures with the United States, which is doing
its work on Iran to protect its own essential security interests.26
In these remarks, Pompeo neither expressly stated that the United States would abide by
the provisional measures nor expressly denied that the United States would do so.27 As suggested by his remarks, the United States already formally provided an exemption to sanctions
“for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices . . . or for the
provision of humanitarian assistance.”28 Nor did Pompeo discuss the implications of the
future U.S. withdrawal from the Treaty of Amity for the pending ICJ case. This withdrawal
would presumably not affect the ICJ’s jurisdiction over the case.29 Indeed, following the
United States’ announcement that it will withdraw from the Treaty of Amity, on October
10 the ICJ ﬁxed time limits for the ﬁling of pleadings, with Iran’s memorial due on April
10, 2019, and the U.S. counter-memorial due on October 10, 2019.30 The withdrawal
would also not prevent a ﬁnding on the merits that the United States had violated its
26
Pompeo Remarks of Oct. 3, supra note 24; see also Galbraith, supra note 24 (quoting additional remarks by
Pompeo with respect to the termination of the Treaty of Amity). When the United States withdrew from the
Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations in 2005, it “emphasized that the ICJ’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention was unexpected” and “that it would comply with the judgments against it that
the ICJ had already issued.” Laurence Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1628 (2005); see also Medellin
v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 503 (2008) (describing President George W. Bush’s efforts to comply with the ICJ judgment in the Avena case).
27
See Pompeo Remarks of Oct. 3, supra note 24 (not providing a direct answer when asked “does the ruling of
the World Court, does that have any practical impact on . . . U.S. sanctions”). The ICJ has determined in a prior
case that provisional measures are binding on the parties as a matter of international law. LeGrand Case (Ger. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 2001 ICJ 466, paras. 98–109 (June 27), available at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/
104/104-20010627-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf (concluding that provisional measures are binding in light of the power
vested in the ICJ in Article 41 of the Statute of the ICJ).
28
U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, Resource Center, OFAC FAQ: Iran Sanctions, FAQ Nos. 297, 318–484, at
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/faqs/Sanctions/Pages/faq_iran.aspx#297 [https://perma.cc/R9R66WBS] (discussing these exceptions and the requirements for meeting them); see also National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. 112-81, at § 1245(d)(2), 125 Stat. 1298, 1648 (2011) (“The
President may not impose sanctions [under another subsection of this statutory provision] with respect to any
person for conducting or facilitating a transaction for the sale of agricultural commodities, food, medicine, or medical devices to Iran.”); Elena Chachko, What to Make of the ICJ’s Provisional Measures in Iran v. U.S. (Nuclear
Sanctions Case), LAWFARE (Oct. 4, 2018) (discussing the existing U.S. exceptions and how they were raised in
the ICJ proceedings).
29
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 ICJ
14, para. 36 (June 27) (measuring jurisdiction based on the time the case was ﬁled and stating that “‘[a]n extrinsic
fact such as the subsequent lapse of the Declaration [or, as in the present case also, the Treaty containing a compromissory clause], by reason of the expiry of the period or by denunciation, cannot deprive the Court of the
jurisdiction already established’”) (quoting Nottebohm Case (Liech. v. Guat.), Judgment, 1953 ICJ 111, 123
(Nov. 18)) (alteration in original).
30
Alleged Violations of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Iran v. U.S.),
Order, 2018 ICJ (Oct. 10), at https://www.icj-cij.org/ﬁles/case-related/175/175-20181010-ORD-01-00-EN.
pdf. In the week between the U.S. announcement of withdrawal from the Treaty of Amity and the order setting
the pleading schedule, the United States “vigorously defend[ed]” itself in oral proceedings in the ICJ in the Certain
Iranian Assets case, which, as noted supra note 14, was also brought pursuant to the Treaty of Amity. U.S. Dep’t of
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international legal obligations to Iran.31 Should the ICJ come to reach such a ﬁnding, however, then the circumstance that the treaty will no longer be in force at the time of judgment
might prove relevant for establishing the duration of the U.S. breach and for identifying the
remedy.32
Amidst the ongoing ICJ proceedings and the threatened and effectuated U.S. sanctions
against Iran, tensions between the countries’ leaders escalated during the summer and fall
of 2018. In a televised speech from Tehran on July 22, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani
warned Trump not to “play with the lion’s tail or else you will regret it” and, after asserting
that the United States could not prevent Iran from exporting its crude oil, stated: “Peace with
Iran would be the mother of all peace and war with Iran would be the mother of all wars.”33 In
response, Trump sent the following warning to Rouhani via Twitter:
To Iranian President Rouhani: NEVER, EVER THREATEN THE UNITED STATES
AGAIN OR YOU WILL SUFFER CONSEQUENCES THE LIKES OF WHICH
FEW THROUGHOUT HISTORY HAVE EVER SUFFERED BEFORE. WE ARE
NO LONGER A COUNTRY THAT WILL STAND FOR YOUR DEMENTED
WORDS OF VIOLENCE & DEATH. BE CAUTIOUS!34
Iranian ofﬁcials responded with scorn and further threats.35 Although Trump has repeatedly indicated his willingness to engage in discussions with the Iranian president, Iranian leaders have rejected this possibility, citing the Trump administration’s hostility and
unreliability.36 At the UN General Assembly in New York on September 24, President

State Press Release, On U.S. Appearance Before the International Court of Justice (Oct. 8, 2018), at https://www.
state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/10/286504.htm [https://perma.cc/6966-F4DA].
31
See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, Art. 13, cmt. 7, November 2001, Supplement No. 10 (A/56/10), chp.IV.E.1, available at http://legal.un.
org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf (stating that “once responsibility has accrued as a
result of an internationally wrongful act, it is not affected by the subsequent termination of the obligation, whether
as a result of the termination of the treaty which has been breached or of a change in international law”).
32
See id. Art. 14, cmt. 8 (“The consequences of a continuing wrongful act will depend on the context, as well as
on the duration of the obligation breached”); see also, e.g., Case Concerning the Difference Between New Zealand
and France Concerning the Interpretation of Application of Two Agreements Concluded on 9 July 1986 Between
the Two States and Related to the Problems Arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair, paras. 114–15, UNRIAA,
Vol. XX (Sales No. E/F.93.V.3) (1990) (considering that reparations would be justiﬁed but not ordering cessation
because “an order for the cessation or discontinuance of wrongful acts or omissions is only justiﬁed in case of continuing breaches of international obligations which are still in force at the time the judicial order is issued”).
33
“Do Not Play with Lion’s Tail”: Rouhani Warns Trump, AL JAZEERA (July 22, 2018), at https://www.aljazeera.
com/news/2018/07/play-lion-tail-rouhani-warns-trump-180722162909627.html.
34
Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (July 22, 2018, 8:24 PM), at https://twitter.com/
realDonaldTrump/status/1021234525626609666.
35
Erin Cunningham & Bijan Sabbagh, After Trump Slams Iran’s President, Iranian Ofﬁcials Accuse Him of
“Psychological Warfare,” WASH. POST (July 23, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/
after-trump-slams-irans-president-iranian-ofﬁcials-accuse-him-of-psychological-warfare/2018/07/23/2cf18d78023c-4be0-9e63-505b87d0047d_story.html; Rick Gladstone, Iranian General Locks Horns with Trump,
Escalating Threat-Filled Feud, N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/26/world/middleeast/suleimani-iran-trump.html.
36
Michael D. Shear & Rick Gladstone, Trump Says He Would Meet with Iranian Leader, but Iran Rules It Out,
N.Y. TIMES (July 30, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/30/us/politics/trump-iran-rouhani.html?
rref=collection%2Fsectioncollection%2Fpolitics.
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Rouhani asserted that he would negotiate only if the United States were to begin abiding
again by the terms of the JCPOA.37
On August 6, Trump issued an executive order announcing the initiation of the ﬁrst phase
of sanctions against Iran.38 These sanctions, which included many secondary sanctions, took
effect on August 7, and targeted Iran’s automotive sector, its trade in gold and precious metals, and the Iranian rial.39 In a statement accompanying his Executive Order, Trump
announced:
The United States is fully committed to enforcing all of our sanctions . . . . Individuals or
entities that fail to wind down activities with Iran risk severe consequences.
I am pleased that many international ﬁrms have already announced their intent to leave
the Iranian market, and several countries have indicated that they will reduce or end
imports of Iranian crude oil. We urge all nations to take such steps to make clear that
the Iranian regime faces a choice: either change its threatening, destabilizing behavior
and reintegrate with the global economy, or continue down a path of economic
isolation.40
Notwithstanding the stark effects of the ﬁrst phase of U.S. sanctions on Iran’s national
economy,41 Iran continued to comply with the JCPOA according to the International
Atomic Energy Agency’s certiﬁcation of August 30.42 In turn, the remaining signatories to
the JCPOA issued a joint statement at the UN General Assembly meeting in New York on
September 24 in which they conﬁrmed their commitment to the JCPOA and “underlined
their determination to protect the freedom of their economic operators to pursue legitimate
business with Iran.”43 This position was reafﬁrmed in a joint statement issued by European
Union foreign policy leader Federica Mogherini and the foreign and ﬁnance ministers of
Britain, France, and Germany on November 2.44 This statement also noted that
European efforts to “preserv[e] and maint[ain] . . . effective ﬁnancial channels with Iran”
and “continu[e] . . . Iran’s export of oil and gas” have “been intensiﬁed in recent weeks.”45
37
David E. Sanger, Iran’s Terms to Reopen Nuclear Talks? Trump Has to Back Down, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24,
2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/24/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-talks-trump-rouhani.html.
38
Exec. Order No. 13,846, 83 Fed. Reg. 38939 (Aug. 6, 2018).
39
Id.
40
Donald J. Trump, Statement from the President on the Reimposition of United States Sanctions with
Respect to Iran, 2018 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. NO. 523 (Aug. 6).
41
The ﬁrst phase of sanctions instituted by the Trump administration against Iran’s non-energy related markets
“provoke[ed] an exodus of international ﬁrms from Iran and contribut[ed] to a dramatic decline in the value of Iran’s
currency.” Tamer El-Ghobashy, U.N. Watchdog Says Iran Continues To Comply with Nuclear Restrictions Despite U.S.
Pullout, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 2018), at https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2018/08/30/un-watchdog-saysiran-continues-comply-with-nuclear-restrictions-despite-us-pullout/?utm_term=.5ac6492c968c.
42
Int’l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Veriﬁcation and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in Light of
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), IAEA Doc. GOV/2018/33 (Aug. 30, 2018).
43
European External Action Serv. Press Release, Implementation of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action:
Joint Ministerial Statement, para. 6 (Sept. 24, 2018), at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/51036/implementation-joint-comprehensive-plan-action-joint-ministerial-statement_en.
44
European External Action Serv. Press Release, Joint Statement by High Representative Federica Mogherini
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It placed particular emphasis on a “European initiative” designed to bypass the reach of sanctions on Iran and European exporters and importers by creating a “Special Purpose Vehicle.”46
Over the summer of 2018, a State Department ofﬁcial indicated that the United States
might grant “case-by-case” extensions to countries with regard to its re-imposition of secondary sanctions.47 On November 2, the Trump administration announced that it would
grant “temporary allotments” to eight jurisdictions, “but only because they have demonstrated signiﬁcant reductions in their crude oil and cooperation on many other fronts and
have made important moves towards getting to zero crude oil importation.”48 These eight
jurisdictions—China, India, Greece, Italy, Taiwan, Japan, Turkey, and South Korea—
will receive temporary waivers from the secondary sanctions with respect to their nation’s
oil imports.49
The second phase of United States sanctions against Iran went into effect on November 5,
signaling the “complet[ion]” of “the termination of United States participation in the Iran
nuclear deal.”50 In announcing this second phase, Trump noted that “we reiterate today
that the sale of food, medicine, medical devices, and agricultural commodities to Iran has
long been, and remains, exempt from the sanctions.”51 He emphasized, however, that all
remaining sanctions that had been lifted pursuant to the JCPOA were re-imposed, including
those related to “Iran’s energy, shipping, and shipbuilding sectors, and sanctions targeting
transactions with the Central Bank of Iran and sanctioned Iranian banks.”52 In addition,
the United States added hundreds of targets to the Specially Designated Nationals and
Blocked Persons List.53
In remarks on November 5, Pompeo stated that “[t]he Iranian regime has a choice. It can
either do a 180-degree turn from its outlaw course of action and act like a normal country, or
it can see its economy crumble.”54 Rouhani responded deﬁantly, asserting “[w]e should break
Id. This “Special Purpose Vehicle” would work to shield foreign companies from the U.S. sanctions by providing an alternative method for companies to move money in and out of Iran rather than relying on Western
banks. Peter Eavis, Europe Plans a Way to Evade Sanctions on Iran. Will It Work?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 4, 2018),
at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/04/business/dealbook/iran-sanctions-europe.html; see also Steven
Erlanger, As U.S. Sanctions on Iran Kick In, Europe Looks for a Workaround, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2018), at
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/05/world/europe/us-iran-sanctions-europe.html.
47
See Gardiner Harris, U.S. Softens Demand That Countries Stop All Iran Oil Imports, N.Y. TIMES (July 2, 2018),
at https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/world/middleeast/us-iran-oil-imports-sanctions-.html.
48
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Sanctions on Iran but Undercuts the Pain with Waivers, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2018), at https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/11/02/world/middleeast/us-iran-sanctions-oil-waivers.html.
49
Harris, supra note 48 (reporting that these waivers have an initial term of six months).
50
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the sanctions very well, and we will do that.”55 He said that Iran is engaged in an “economic
war” with the United States and that the Americans “must be punished once and for all” for
their “language of force, pressure, and threats to speak to the great Iranian nation.”56 On
November 12, 2018, the IAEA once again reported that Iran remained compliant with the
JCPOA.57
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